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Toward a Revised 4.2 No-Contact Rule
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.∗
Dana Remus Irwin∗∗

Introduction
In our adversarial system of legal representation, ethical rules of
attorney conduct focus on protecting the client. Accordingly, the two
mainstays of legal ethics are the duties, owed to clients, of loyalty and
confidentiality. The duty of loyalty requires lawyers to adopt clients’
interests as their own; the duty of confidentiality requires lawyers to keep
matters relating to a representation confidential. A lawyer and client can
then act together as a close working group, generally governed by
principles of agency law.
However, a lawyer’s duties to clients are constrained by obligations
to others—to other persons, to the courts, and to the system of law and
justice at large. Thus, for example, a lawyer may not engage in or assist in
fraud committed on others; owes duties of candor to the courts; and must
1
comply generally with the law of the land. Another set of obligations,
stated in general terms, requires a lawyer to deal fairly with others while
acting on behalf of a client.
Our focus here is on Rule 4.2, the “no-contact” provision:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or court
2
order.

Rule 4.2 is only one of several provisions directly protective of third
persons. In the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 4.2 is situated in a cluster that includes Rules
4.1 through 4.4. Rule 4.1 provides that a lawyer “shall not

∗ Thomas E. Miller Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California Hastings, College
of the Law; Trustee Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
∗∗ Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce Law Center.
1. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2, 3.3, 8.4 (2008).
2. Id. R. 4.2; see also Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 7-104(A)(1) (1969); ABA
Canons of Prof’l Ethics No. 9 (1908).
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knowingly . . . make a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person; or . . . fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary
3
to avoid assisting in a criminal or fraudulent act by a client . . . .” Rule
4.3 provides that:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented
by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is
disinterested. . . . The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an
unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the
lawyer knows . . . the interests of such a person are . . . in conflict with
4
the interests of the client.

Rule 4.4 provides that “[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall not use
means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay or
5
burden a third person.”
Other rules have similar effect in constraining and qualifying
lawyers’ duties on behalf of their clients. Rule 3.3(a)(1) prohibits a
6
lawyer from making a “false statement of fact or law to a tribunal”; Rule
3.3(a)(3) prohibits a lawyer from offering “evidence that the lawyer
7
knows to be false”; Rule 3.3(d) requires that in an ex parte proceeding, a
lawyer “inform the tribunal of all material facts . . . whether or not the
8
facts are adverse.” Rule 3.4, meanwhile, includes a panoply of
obligations to “opposing party and counsel,” which incorporate various
rules of civil and criminal procedure that are themselves protective of
9
opposing parties.
In short, the idea voiced long ago by Lord Brougham that a lawyer
10
“knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his client,” is
simply not true and never has been. A lawyer representing a client must
“know” many others. But under the no-contact provision of Rule 4.2, a
lawyer is strictly circumscribed in whether and how to “know” a certain
class of others—those who turn out to be clients of another lawyer.
Our thesis is that as now written, Rule 4.2 is overbroad and
ambiguous in important respects. There is a strong argument that the
Rule should be repealed and its work done by Rule 4.3—that is, a lawyer
should not present himself to a nonclient as disinterested, should not give
legal advice (except to consult another lawyer), and should not negotiate
11
with a person he knows to be represented. In the law of professional
3. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.1 (2008).
4. Id. R. 4.3.
5. Id. R. 4.4.
6. Id. R. 3.3(a)(1).
7. Id. R. 3.3(a)(3).
8. Id. R. 3.3(d).
9. See id. R. 3.4.
10. Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 580 (1986); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Jr., Lawyer for the Situation, 39 Val. U. L. Rev. 377, 378 (2004).
11. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.3.
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ethics, however, once a rule protective of the profession has been
adopted, repeal is unlikely. In the absence of repeal, we propose reform
along the lines described herein.

I. Rule 4.2 as It Is
Model Rule 4.2’s version of the no-contact rule, set forth above, is
12
currently in force in substantially similar form in all U.S. jurisdictions.
Its roots can be found in Canon 9 of the 1908 ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics, which advised that “[a] lawyer should not in any way
communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented
by counsel; much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise
13
the matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel.” Canon 9
was effectively a rule of evidence, however, and its no-contact concept
was much more limited than that of today’s provision. Case law
addressing the canon generally focused on whether concessions or
admissions obtained directly from a represented person should be denied
14
legal effect.
After the promulgation of the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1970, this early formulation of the rule was expanded
15
into the current prophylaxis of “no contact.” DR 7-104(A)(1), which
was carried forward in substantially similar form in Model Rule 4.2,
provided that a lawyer should not “communicate . . . on the subject of the
representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in
that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing
16
such other party or is authorized by law to do so.” Initially, ethics
committees and courts treated DR 7-104(A)(1) with a more or less
uncritical deference. They viewed the no-contact rule as providing
necessary protection to lay persons who often lack the knowledge,
training, and skills to protect their own interests, particularly when
17
dealing with a lawyer representing an adversary. Some such protection
against lawyer overreaching is no doubt desirable, but courts and
litigants interpreted the rule to go farther, and to require that all
12. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. b (2000).
13. ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No. 9 (1908).
14. See, e.g., Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371, 376–78 (9th Cir. 1968) (Hamley, J.,
dissenting); Reinke v. United States, 405 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Smith, 379 F.2d
628, 633 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Ferguson, 243 F. Supp. 237, 238 (D.D.C. 1965); Juskowitz v.
Hahn, 56 Misc. 2d 647, 648 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968); State v. Nicholson, 463 P.2d 633, 636–37 (Wash.
1969). But see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 108 (1934) (referring to
Canon 9’s broad prohibition).
15. Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 7-104(A)(1) (1969).
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Guerrerio, 675 F. Supp. 1430, 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Comm. on
Prof’l Ethics of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Inquiry Ref. No. 80-46, at 7 (1980)
[hereinafter N.Y.C. Bar Inquiry Ref. No. 80-46]; see also Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. b.
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information and communications with a represented person be routed
18
19
through the lawyer. DR 7-104(A)(1) came to be “strictly construe[d]”
as a broad and strict prohibition against any communications—written or
oral, direct or indirect—with any represented person in any legal context.
Its successor provision, Model Rule 4.2, adopted this broad and strict
approach.
The primary advantage of this approach is the predictable standard
of conduct it purports to provide through an absolute prohibition on
contact. It also eases problems of proof by making the critical evidential
issue whether there was contact with a represented person, rather than
what was said or done in the course of the contact. This approach has
shortcomings as well, however. It fails to accommodate countervailing
interests, and it offers little flexibility to address situations where the
rule’s application has undesirable or adverse results. For example, it
subjects a lawyer to risk of disqualification for exercising her authority
and fulfilling her duty to investigate facts by interrogating witnesses.
These problems are exacerbated by the procedural context in which
the rule is typically invoked. Rarely is it raised in the disciplinary context,
where, strictly speaking, ethical rules have their only sovereign effect.
20
Instead, it is typically raised in a motion in litigation. Use of the rules of
attorney conduct as standards in contexts outside of discipline is both
acceptable and proper, but different contexts give rise to different
21
sanctions. In the disciplinary context, the sanction for an infraction of
22
the no-contact rule would likely be a reprimand. In a litigation context,
in contrast, the sanction typically sought is disqualification of opposing
counsel, and courts typically feel obliged to award it, whether or not real
23
injury has resulted. In fact, it is rare that a motion complains of actual
injury to the protected client—for example, the elicitation of harmful
admissions—and rare also that the remedy sought is suppression of the
harmful admission, rather than expulsion of counsel.
Even if the text of Model Rule 4.2 is not changed, courts should be
24
mindful that the proper remedy is a matter of judicial discretion, and

18. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 359 (1991).
19. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 517 (1962).
20. See, e.g., Faison v. Thornton, 863 F. Supp. 1204 (D. Nev. 1993); MMR/Wallace Power &
Indus. v. Thames Assocs., 764 F. Supp. 712, 714 (D. Conn. 1991); Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 720 F. Supp. 1080, 1084–87 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Shoney’s, Inc. v. Lewis, 875 S.W.2d 514, 514–16
(Ky. 1994).
21. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 6 (2000).
22. We know of no specific disciplinary case, which indicates that unless the accused lawyer had
obviously exploited a naïve individual, the worst sanction that would be imposed would be a
reprimand.
23. See cases cited supra note 20; see also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers § 99 cmt. b.
24. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 6 cmts. c, i.
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that in the absence of actual or apparent injury, an admonition or
referral to a disciplinary authority could be the appropriate response. As
Comment i to section 6 of the Restatement (Third) states, “tribunals
should be vigilant to prevent [the motion for disqualification] as a tactic
by which one party may impose unwarranted delay, costs, and other
25
burdens on another.”
Addressing Rule 4.2’s sanctions, however, will not address the root
of the Rule’s problems—its overbroad and inflexible prohibition on
communications. These problems invite new attention to the Rule’s text,
comments, and application. Accordingly, the next Part reviews,
evaluates, and proposes change to current conceptions of Rule 4.2’s
function within the legal system.

II. Rule 4.2’s Purpose
As commonly explained, the no-contact rule has two primary
functions: (i) protecting the client-lawyer relationship from interference
by opposing counsel and (ii) shielding the client from improper
26
approaches by opposing counsel. These functions overlap to a
substantial degree, but are conceptually, and often functionally, distinct.
Courts and commentators recite both functions, but generally focus on
27
the latter. A third function—protection of the lawyer’s interest in the
client-lawyer relationship—is less frequently discussed.
The 2002 amendments to Model Rule 4.2 included a new Comment
1, which articulates the Rule’s purpose as follows:
This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system
by protecting a person who has chosen to be represented by a lawyer in
a matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers who are
participating in the matter, interference by those lawyers with the
client-lawyer relationship and the uncounseled disclosure of
28
information relating to the representation.

The Restatement (Third)’s explanation of the no-contact rule is
substantially similar:
[States’ no-contact rules] protect against overreaching and deception of
nonclients. The rule of this Section also protects the relationship
between the represented nonclient and that person’s lawyer and

25. Id. § 6 cmt. i.
26. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995); ABA
Comm. of Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 108 (1934).
27. See, e.g., Wright ex rel. Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 567 (Wash. 1984)
(explaining that in recent years, “the purpose of the rule has been said to shield the represented client
from improper approaches”). Commentators have noted this shift. See, e.g., Sophie Hager Hume,
Comment, Niesig v. Team I: Permitting Ex Parte Communication with Corporate Employees, 57
Brook. L. Rev. 953, 957 (1991); Stephen M. Sinaiko, Note, Ex Parte Communication and the
Corporate Adversary: A New Approach, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1456, 1463–64 (1991).
28. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 1 (2008).
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assures the confidentiality of the nonclient’s communications with the
29
lawyer.

Courts and commentators have elaborated on the ways in which
Rule 4.2 serves its three functions of protecting the client, the lawyer,
30
and the client-lawyer relationship. They have explained that the Rule
guards a party against rhetorical attack by opposing counsel, which could
undermine the party’s confidence in her lawyer’s competence and
31
assessment of a case. The Rule prevents opposing counsel from causing
a party to ignore her lawyer’s advice and from “driving a wedge”
32
between a party and her lawyer. And it protects the attorney-client
privilege—critical to a strong client-lawyer relationship—by precluding
33
inadvertent or legally imprudent disclosures of privileged information.
This last function—protection of the attorney-client privilege—is
thought by many to be the core function of Rule 4.2. Our constitutional
tradition honors the attorney-client privilege as a rule of privacy and of
protection of citizens from the force of government coercion, even while
34
accepting that the privilege can sometimes obstruct access to truth. The
merits of this trade-off may be debatable, and the traditional value
placed on the privilege has been periodically challenged, but it remains a
35
central feature of legal representation. Rule 4.2’s role in reinforcing its
protections is therefore critical.

29. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. b (citation omitted).
30. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995) (no-contact
rule “safeguard[s] the client-lawyer relationship from interference by adverse counsel”).
31. See, e.g., Univ. Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 737 F. Supp. 325, 327–28 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Polycast
Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 720 F. Supp. 1080, 1082, 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); N.Y.C. Bar Inquiry Ref. No. 80-46, supra note
17.
32. Polycast, 129 F.R.D. at 625.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 646 (2d Cir. 1983); Univ. Patents, 737 F. Supp. at
327; Polycast, 129 F.R.D. at 625; N.Y.C. Bar Inquiry Ref. No. 80-46, supra note 17; see also Sherman L.
Cohn, The Organizational Client: Attorney-Client Privilege and the No-Contact Rule, 10 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 739, 744 (1997); Jerome N. Krulewitch, Ex Parte Communications with Corporate Parties: The
Scope of the Limitations on Attorney Communications with One of Adverse Interest, 82 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1274, 1278 (1988).
34. See Charles Tilford McCormick et al., McCormick on Evidence § 87, at 204–05 (3d ed.
1984); 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 503(02), at 503–16
(1990).
35. See Michael L. Seigel, Corporate America Fights Back: The Battle over Waiver of the AttorneyClient Privilege, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2008). The privilege’s central role has recently been reaffirmed
by new DOJ regulations, issued by Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip, which change previous
policy and forbid federal prosecutors from requesting a corporation to waive the attorney client and/or
work product privilege in exchange for lenient treatment. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States
Attorneys’ Manual 9-28.710 (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/corp-chargingguidelines.pdf; see also Mark R. Filip, Deputy U.S. Attorney Gen., Remarks at Press Conference
Announcing Revisions to Corporate Charging Guidelines (Aug. 28, 2008) (transcript available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2008/dag-speech-0808286.html) (announcing and explaning
the new guidelines).

March 2009]

TOWARD A REVISED 4.2 NO-CONTACT RULE

803

Rule 4.2’s protections extend beyond the scope of the attorney-client
privilege, however. Applied strictly according to its terms, the Rule
effectively insulates represented individuals from all informal interviews
and investigations. Accordingly, it guards against the inadvertent or
imprudent disclosures of unprivileged as well as privileged information—
information of a kind a client may ultimately have to disclose in
deposition. Courts have recognized this broad protection, speaking of the
Rule as functioning to decrease the chances that a represented person
36
will disclose harmful information. Lawyers place a high value on this
function, since a client’s disclosure of any kind can seriously damage a
litigation position. But granting lawyers complete professional control of
information produces debatable effects—potentially protecting clients
against legal responsibility for their conduct and inhibiting the search for
truth.
Rule 4.2’s effects are debatable in other respects as well. For
example, the Rule can function to favor those who are wealthy or
37
sophisticated enough to have a lawyer on retainer. The Rule’s
protections, as well as those of the attorney-client privilege, are available
to litigants as soon as they engage legal counsel. Inevitably, however,
legal representation is more readily available to individuals who are
sophisticated and affluent than individuals who are not.
By affording protection against disclosure of harmful information to
individuals who retain counsel, Rule 4.2 enhances the practical value of
legal representation and therefore the economic value of the lawyer’s
services. This highlights the Rule’s third and less noted function—
protecting lawyers’ interests in their relationships with clients. An ABA
opinion recognized that the Rule’s prohibition is “imperative in the right
38
and interest of the adverse party and his attorney,” and the California
Supreme Court explained that “[t]he rule was designed to permit an
attorney to function adequately in his proper role and to prevent the
39
opposing attorney from impeding his performance in such role.” In
granting lawyers full control over all communications, the Rule can also
serve less legitimate interests of the lawyer. John Leubsdorf notes the
36. See, e.g., Univ. Patents, 737 F. Supp. at 327; Polycast, 129 F.R.D. at 625.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Fitterer,
710 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Vasquez, 675 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir. 1982); United
States v. Masullo, 489 F.2d 217, 223–24 (2d Cir. 1973); see also Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell,
State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The Controversies over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena
Rules, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 291, 340 (1992); John Leubsdorf, Communicating with Another Lawyer’s
Client: The Lawyer’s Veto and the Client’s Interest, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 683, 702 (1979).
38. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 108 (1934) (emphasis added); see
also United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1451–52 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
39. Mitton v. State Bar, 455 P.2d 753, 758 (Cal. 1969); see also In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 485
(D.N.M. 1992) (stating that the rule is designed “‘to ensure that the adverse party’s attorney can
function properly’” (quoting Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1447–49)).
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possibility of a lawyer delaying the transmittal of a settlement offer in
40
order to prolong a case and increase fees. Another possibility is a
lawyer intentionally taking a position in tone or substance that prolongs
or exacerbates differences that the parties could otherwise resolve.
To minimize the dangers of a no-contact rule that favors
sophisticated and affluent individuals or that allows lawyers to protect
their own interests at the expense of clients’, we propose two changes to
common conceptions of Model Rule 4.2’s function. First, we propose that
the Rule be understood primarily in terms of protecting the client-lawyer
relationship, not the client or the lawyer individually. Comment 1 to
Model Rule 4.2 currently explains that the Rule “contributes to the
proper functioning of the legal system by protecting a person who has
41
chosen to be represented by a lawyer.” While protecting the “proper
functioning of the legal system” is a central purpose of all ethical rules, it
is not clear that this purpose is always and necessarily served by
42
protecting “a person . . . represented by a lawyer.” To the contrary,
there is no apparent justification for giving a represented person
protection above and beyond the existing protections of effective
representation. Accordingly, we propose modifying Comment 1 to focus
clearly and unambiguously on protection of the client-lawyer
relationship.
Additionally, we think that conceptions of Rule 4.2’s proper function
should account for the various and often competing interests implicated
by the Rule. As noted in the introduction, the corpus of ethical rules has
43
increasingly recognized the need to balance countervailing interests.
For example, the idea of absolute loyalty to the client has been qualified
by duties of candor to the court and to nonclients and by an enlarged
scope of self-protection for lawyers against clients who turn out to be
44
dishonest and criminal. The protection afforded client confidences,
meanwhile, has been qualified to allow a lawyer to disclose information
to interdict substantial unlawful injuries to third parties and to defend
45
himself against implication in a client’s wrongdoing.
40. Leubsdorf, supra note 37, at 689–90.
41. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 1 (2008).
42. Id.
43. See John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyering in a Hybrid Adversary System, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
45, 49 (1996). See generally John Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 Cornell L.
Rev. 1021 (1982). In large part, this is to respond to criticisms that a pure model subordinates truth in
the hierarchy or values and leads to distributional injustice, and in recognition that loyalty to a client
can sometimes impose unacceptable costs on third parties. See, e.g., Marvin Frankel, The Search for
Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031 (1975).
44. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1–.4.
45. In 2003, Model Rule 1.6(b) was revised to add the following additional exceptions permitting
adverse disclosure of confidential information:
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to
result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in
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No such qualifications have been made to Rule 4.2—either to
conceptions of its proper function or to its application in practice. This is
not because countervailing interests are not implicated. To the contrary,
Rule 4.2 affects various interests of the adversary, third parties, and the
legal system as a whole. Primary among these is an interest in informal
factfinding—an alternative to formal discovery that provides several
advantages to adverse parties and the legal system as a whole but that
46
Rule 4.2 effectively precludes. Informal factfinding limits the financial
47
and time burdens placed on the parties and on courts. It allows lawyers
48
to fulfill their Rule 11 duty to substantiate claims prior to filing suit
49
when formal discovery has not yet become unavailable. And it may
produce more relevant and useful information, as witnesses may speak
more freely in an informal ex parte interview than in the more
intimidating atmosphere of a formal deposition. Moreover, it affords the
investigating lawyer confidentiality in developing a theory of the case
50
and producing attorney work product. Rule 4.2 effectively deprives
litigants of all of these benefits of informal discovery.
Rule 4.2 interferes with various third-party interests as well. An
individual in danger of imminent harm at the hands of a represented
person has an interest in a direct warning from that person’s lawyer. A
whistleblower within a represented organization has an interest in
speaking with outside opposing counsel without first gaining approval
from the organization’s lawyer. And society has an interest in effective
crime prevention and just resolution of disputes. Even the client covered
by Rule 4.2 has an interest that goes unnoticed by the Rule—namely,
autonomy within the client-lawyer relationship.
In reconsidering the Rule’s proper formulation and application, we
think that these interests should be explicitly addressed. Just as other
rules of attorney conduct have been modified to account for the full
range of implicated interests, so too should the obligations of Rule 4.2 be
modified to account for the competing interests of the adversary, third
parties, and the justice system as a whole. Accordingly, we propose
replacing Model Rule 4.2’s current Comment 1 with the following:

furtherance of which the client used or is using the lawyer’s services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property
of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission
of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services[.]
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) (2004); cf. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.
1.6(b) (2003).
46. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 100(2) cmt. b.
47. Id. § 99 cmt. b.
48. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.1 (2008).
49. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(1).
50. See, e.g., IBM v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1975).
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This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system by
protecting the client-lawyer relationship against interference by other
lawyers participating in the matter. It protects against another lawyer’s
influence that might undermine a client’s confidence in his or her
lawyer, or lead a client to disclose privileged or confidential
information, to refrain from pursuing claims or a course of action, to
agree to a settlement, or to take other action without the advice of
counsel. These interests are not unlimited and must be balanced with
accommodation of the functions of informal investigation and factfinding in limiting costs, substantiating claims, and promoting
51
legitimate law enforcement activities.

This articulation of Rule 4.2’s purpose forms the foundation of our
critique of the Rule’s practical application, and our proposal for its
reform is set forth in the next Part.

III. Rule 4.2’s Application
As currently articulated and applied, Rule 4.2 leads to results that
are sometimes undesirable and other times unpredictable. The efforts in
some decisions to accommodate competing interests have resulted in a
discrepancy between the text of the Rule and the meanings it has been
52
given. To explain and address these problems, this Part reviews eight
contexts in which the proper application of Rule 4.2 is either unclear or
unjust: (1) law enforcement investigations, (2) communications with
government officials, (3) other communications that have been
interpreted by courts as “authorized by law,” (4) communications
initiated by represented persons, (5) communications responding to
emergencies, (6) communications by a lawyer who is a party to a matter,
(7) communications with constituents of a represented organization, and
(8) communications with putative members of a class. After reviewing
the difficulties presented by each context, we propose modifications to
the Rule to better effectuate what we consider to be its principal
function—safeguarding
the
client-lawyer
relationship,
while
acknowledging and balancing countervailing interests. The text of
current Model Rule 4.2 is attached in Appendix 1 and the text of our
proposed revision is attached in Appendix 2.
A. Law Enforcement Investigations
Rule 4.2 has two exceptions to its prohibition on communication by
53
a lawyer with a person represented by another lawyer. Communications
are allowed if (i) consented to by the represented person’s lawyer, or (ii)
54
authorized by law. The first of these is merely formal; it is implausible
51. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2 cmt. 1.
52. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55
Vand. L. Rev. 381, 460 (2002) (noting problems of “implementing haphazard exceptions”).
53. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2.
54. Id.
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that a lawyer representing a client would consent to direct contact in
circumstances in which the Rule’s protective purpose is implicated.
Operatively, therefore, the Rule has only one exception—
communications “authorized by law.”
The opaque phrase “authorized by law” originally appeared in DR
7-104 of the 1970 Model Code and was adopted by the drafters of Model
55
Rule 4.2 in 1983 with full awareness of its ambiguity. The current Model
Rule provides no definition of the phrase, and the only guidance it offers
are two illustrations, both of which are hopelessly vague—“investigative
activities of lawyers representing governmental entities” and
“communications by a lawyer on behalf of a client who is exercising a
constitutional or other legal right to communicate with the
56
government.”
The Rule’s application in the context of investigatory activities has a
long and contentious history, which gained prominence after the Second
57
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hammad. There, the Second
Circuit held that Rule 4.2 prohibited communications with suspects of a
58
criminal investigation prior to the initiation of formal proceedings. The
original opinion was withdrawn and replaced by an opinion conceding
that “legitimate investigation techniques” can sometimes be “authorized
59
by law,” but the Department of Justice (DOJ) nevertheless reacted with
alarm. The DOJ worried that the decision would deprive government
lawyers of important tools of investigation and would chill their
60
investigative efforts. Accordingly, in June 1989, Attorney General
Richard Thornburgh issued a departmental memorandum stating that
the law enforcement activities of DOJ lawyers were “authorized” by
federal law and therefore exempt from application of states’ no-contact
61
rules. The defense bar and the ABA countered that the memorandum’s
approach was impermissible in so far as it attempted to exempt DOJ
62
lawyers from the ethical obligations generally applicable to lawyers.
55. See, e.g., 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering
§ 38.9 (3d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2008); Cramton & Udell, supra note 37, at 318–28; F. Dennis Saylor IV &
J. Douglas Wilson, Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: The Application of Model Rule 4.2 to
Federal Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 459 (1992); Todd S. Schulman, Wisdom Without Power: The
Department of Justice’s Attempt to Exempt Federal Prosecutors from State No-Contact Rules, 71
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1067, 1074–78 (1996).
56. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 5.
57. 846 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1988), modified, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988).
58. Id. at 858–59.
59. Hammad, 858 F.2d at 839.
60. See Communications with Represented Persons, 28 C.F.R. § 77 (2008).
61. Memorandum from Richard L. Thornburgh, U.S. Attorney Gen., to All Justice Department
Litigators (June 8, 1989), reprinted in In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 489–93 ex. E (D.N.M. 1992).
62. See ABA Adds Two Model Rules on Subpoenas, Practice Sales, 6 Laws. Man. on Prof.
Conduct Current Rep. (ABA/BNA) 25, 27 (Feb. 28, 1990) (noting ABA resolution opposing “any
attempt by the Department of Justice unilaterally to exempt its lawyers from the professional conduct
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In 1994, the DOJ issued a new no-contact rule, applicable to all
63
federal prosecutors and endeavoring to carry the force of law. Termed
the Reno Regulation, its stated purpose was “to ensure that government
attorneys adhere to the highest ethical standards, while eliminating the
uncertainty and confusion arising from the variety of interpretations of
state rules, some of which have been incorporated as local court rules in
64
a number of federal district courts.” The Reno Regulation purported to
preempt and supersede state ethical rules, but unlike the Thornburgh
memorandum, it gave specific guidance about what types of investigatory
contacts were permissible. These included contacts occurring “up until
the point at which [the contacted individuals] are arrested or charged
65
with a crime or named as defendants in a civil law enforcement action.”
The Regulation explicitly stated that it “d[id] not permit federal
prosecutors to attempt to negotiate plea agreements, settlements, or
similar arrangements with individuals represented by counsel without the
66
consent of their attorneys.”
Paralleling the negative response to the Thornburgh memorandum
and notwithstanding substantial differences in the Reno version, the
ABA, defense lawyers, and many commentators objected on two
grounds: first, that the DOJ could not hold its attorneys to unique ethical
standards; and second, that the DOJ lacked authority to promulgate
regulations that preempted state ethics rules and superseded federal
67
court rules. The DOJ responded that the regulation had been adopted
68
under its rulemaking power and carried the full force and effect of law.
Disagreement then centered on whether the DOJ’s rulemaking power
69
encompassed the authority to promulgate ethical rules.
70
In 1998, Congress weighed in. Explicitly rejecting the DOJ’s
attempts to regulate federal prosecutors’ contacts with represented
persons, it adopted what came to be known as the McDade

rules that apply to all lawyers under applicable rules of the jurisdictions in which they practice”); Tom
Watson, AG Decrees Prosecutors May Bypass Counsel, Legal Times, Sept. 25, 1989, at 1.
63. See Communications with Represented Persons, 28 C.F.R. § 77.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995); Jeffrey Kanige,
Ex Parte Interviews: Bright Lines, Big Debate, N.J. L.J., June 13, 1994, at 5; Maria B. Rubin, The
Thornburgh Memo, Now the Reno Rule: A Case of Ethics, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 23, 1994, at 1; see also
Schulman, supra note 55, at 1093–111.
68. Communications with Represented Persons, 28 C.F.R. § 77; see also Hazard, Jr. & Hodes,
supra note 55.
69. See, e.g., United States v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252, 1257 (8th Cir. 1998); In re
Howes, 940 P.2d 159, 164–68 (N.M. 1997). For a discussion of this controversy, see Schulman, supra
note 55, at 1093–111.
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2006).
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71

Amendment. The Amendment provides: “An attorney for the
Government shall be subject to State laws and rules, and local Federal
court rules, governing attorneys in each State where such attorney
engages in that attorney’s duties, to the same extent and in the same
72
manner as other attorneys in that State.” The effect of the Amendment
is to apply state no-contact rules to federal prosecutors just as they apply
to state prosecutors (and to all other lawyers). Commentators have noted
significant differences between the activities of state and federal
73
prosecutors, however, rendering this approach problematic. State
investigations are typically conducted by the police, who are not subject
to Rule 4.2; state prosecutors become involved only after an arrest has
74
been made. Federal investigations, in contrast, are more likely to
75
involve federal prosecutors from their inception. Federal prosecutors
are also more likely to prosecute complex and ongoing crimes, and rely
76
upon coordinated investigations and complex surveillance techniques.
Tension is ongoing between DOJ lawyers, who want to exercise
supervisory authority over investigations, and the Federal Bureau of
77
Investigations (FBI), which seeks autonomy. The tension continues
notwithstanding the FBI’s nominally subordinate position to the DOJ.
Classifying the FBI as an independent agency (rather than a subordinate
instrument of the DOJ) would allow it to conduct more intrusive
communication with suspects, because Rule 4.2 would not apply and
federal investigations would therefore have fewer constraints. As the
78
DOJ and commentators have noted, this is a perverse consequence.
The DOJ also notes that federal prosecutors are more likely than
state prosecutors to be involved in investigations that extend across state
79
lines. The McDade Amendment could therefore subject a federal

71. Id. For a discussion of the McDade Amendment, see Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the
“American Criminal Class”: Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 599, 625, 650–56 (2004).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 530B.
73. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 Geo. L.J.
207, 216 (2000); Note, Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment, 113
Harv. L. Rev. 2080, 2090 (2000) [hereinafter Federal Prosecutors].
74. Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 55; Zacharias & Green, supra note 73, at 237.
75. Zacharias & Green, supra note 73, at 237.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103
Colum. L. Rev. 749, 821–23 (2003).
78. See id.; see also The Effect of State Ethics Rules on Federal Law Enforcement: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 94 (1999)
(statement of Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., in response to questions from Sen. Leahy) (noting that it is
“highly desirable that Government lawyers supervise investigations by federal agents” because the
lawyers “know the rules better and the risks . . . of violating the rules”); Federal Prosecutors, supra
note 73, at 2091.
79. Federal Prosecutors, supra note 73, at 2091.
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prosecutor to multiple and inconsistent state standards. The inevitable
result, the DOJ contends, will be a chilling of investigative efforts and a
81
decrease in effective law enforcement. On the one hand, this risk may
be largely theoretical. The rule in effect in most states is nearly uniform
82
in its text. On the other hand, differences in judicial interpretations
may, in fact, pose problems of conflicting guidance.
In any event, the McDade Amendment does not address the key
issue of what communications are “authorized by law” and therefore
83
permissible. Relying on this ambiguity, the DOJ continues to assert the
validity of its policy that certain lawful investigatory techniques are
authorized by law and permissible under the Rule. Courts, meanwhile,
continue to disagree on whether Rule 4.2 applies to federal prosecutors
84
engaged in investigations that are otherwise entirely lawful.
Attempting to reconcile the positions of the DOJ, Congress, and the
defense bar, the ABA’s Ethics Committee and the Ethics 2000
Commission recommended substantial amendments to Model Rule 4.2 in
85
2002. Among other changes, the amendments would have authorized (i)
communications with represented persons by federal agents acting under
direction of government lawyers prior to the initiation of formal law
enforcement proceedings, and (ii) communications with a represented
organization’s agent or employee who initiated a communication relating
86
to a law enforcement investigation. The ABA declined to adopt the
proposed amendments.
The debate over the “authorized by law” exception continues.
Particularly problematic is the relationship between the exception and
the constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants. There is
substantial overlap between the protections of the no-contact rule and
those of the Constitution, since the right-to-counsel protections of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments prohibit direct contact in some
87
preindictment and most postindictment contexts. The overlap is not
80. Id.; Green & Zacharias, supra note 52, at 459.
81. See Communications with Represented Persons, 28 C.F.R. § 77 (2008).
82. See American Legal Ethics Library, Topical Overview: Index of Narratives,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/comparative/index.htm#4.2 (last visited Mar. 23, 2009) (listing of
states’ formulations of the rule).
83. Nor does it abrogate decisions holding that preindictment communications are “authorized by
law.” See Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct Reference Man. (ABA/BNA) 71:303 (Oct. 29. 2008) (citing
cases).
84. Id. 71:301.
85. See ABA Ethics Groups Recommend Changes to Model Rule on Ex Parte Communication, 15
Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct Current Rep. (ABA/BNA) 347, 347 (July 21, 1999).
86. See id.
87. Before indictment, the Fifth Amendment prohibits contact with a suspect in custody who has
invoked the right to counsel. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477 (1980). After indictment, the Sixth Amendment prohibits contact, initiated by the prosecutor, with
a defendant regarding the indicted crime without the presence of counsel. Brewer v. Williams, 430
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complete, however, and the question arises whether a prosecutor’s
communication with a represented person, lawful under the Constitution,
is nevertheless impermissible under Rule 4.2. The policies supporting the
Rule’s prohibition are particularly compelling in the context of criminal
law enforcement proceedings, since “[n]ot only are criminal
interrogations more formidable and the potential consequences of a
criminal action more severe than in civil litigation, but the criminal client
88
seems more likely to be unsophisticated.” But effective law
enforcement could be severely hampered by strict application of Rule
4.2. Moreover, there is a persuasive argument for deference to the
constitutional standards, which were designed to strike a proper balance
between the interests of the defendant and those of society.
Currently, Comment 5 to the Model Rule 4.2 offers the following
guidance:
When communicating with the accused in a criminal matter, a
government lawyer must comply with this Rule in addition to honoring
the constitutional rights of the accused. The fact that a communication
does not violate a state or federal constitutional right is insufficient to
89
establish that the communication is permissible under this Rule.

The Comment’s position—that Rule 4.2 can prohibit contacts that the
Constitution would allow—does not settle the matter. It is
understandable that the ABA (as official author of the Comment) did
not wish to pronounce on constitutional law or on decisional law
interpretations of the “authorized by law” exception. But the
unfortunate result was a comment with little meaningful direction or
guidance, which has created much confusion.
Comment 5’s guidance has been questioned by some authorities and
90
rejected by others. Among the jurisdictions struggling with the issue is
California. In the course of that state’s commendable effort to harmonize
its unique Rules of Professional Conduct with the ABA Model Rules,
the drafters encountered the ambiguities and conflicts of Rule 4.2. An
initial issue was whether “authorized” should mean “specifically
permitted” (which would be unusual for legislation) or “not prohibited”
(which would make the constitutional and ethical rules coextensive in
scope). In the course of deliberating over this distinction, DOJ lawyers
from California revealed themselves to be in a paradoxical situation. In
U.S. 387 (1976); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1963).
88. Cramton & Udell, supra note 37, at 327.
89. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 5 (2008).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 436 (3d Cir. 1996); Grievance Comm. v. Simels,
48 F.3d 640, 650–51 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Powe, 9 F.3d 68, 70 (9th Cir. 1993); United States
v. Heinz, 983 F.2d 609, 613 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 739 (10th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 840 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346,
1366 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States v. Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1339 (9th Cir. 1981).

812

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:797

the special drafting committee, federal prosecutors advocated use of
“permitted by law” as the operative phrase. But when in court to defend
contact with a suspect or an accused, they have argued that “authorized”
91
means “not prohibited.”
The answers to three unsettled questions will be critical to resolving
the issue of when and to what extent prosecutors—particularly federal
prosecutors—may directly contact or arrange contact with represented
suspects. First, is it permissible for a prosecuting authority governed by a
no-contact rule to communicate with a represented person prior to the
initiation of formal law enforcement proceedings? Second, is such
communication permissible with a criminal defendant who has validly
waived the right to counsel and attempted to waive the no-contact rule?
Third, is direct communication with a represented defendant permissible
if it addresses “unrelated” matters? And how is “unrelated” defined?
Most authorities answer the first question—whether it is permissible
to communicate with a represented person prior to the initiation of
formal law enforcement proceedings and therefore prior to attachment
92
of Sixth Amendment rights—in the affirmative. In United States v.
Balter, a Third Circuit panel reviewed case law from several circuits and
concluded that “with the exception of the Second Circuit [in Hammad],
every court of appeals that has considered a similar case has held . . . that
[no-contact rules] do not apply to preindictment criminal investigations
93
by government attorneys.” Most state courts have drawn similar
94
conclusions, rejecting Comment 5’s position that constitutionallypermissible contacts are not necessarily ethically permissible.
The Model Rule answers the second question—whether a
prosecutor can communicate with a defendant who initiates contact and

91. As observed by one of the Authors during consultations, the federal lawyers argued while in
court that the term covered their activity but then changed their argument during the California Rules
revision process, wanting a clear cover.
92. See, e.g., Balter, 91 F.3d at 436; Simels, 48 F.3d at 650; Powe, 9 F.3d at 70; Heinz, 983 F.2d at
612; Ryans, 903 F.2d at 739; Hammad, 858 F.2d at 840; Sutton, 801 F.2d at 1366; Fitterer, 710 F.2d at
1333; Kenny, 645 F.2d at 1339; see also Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 55, § 38.10.
93. 91 F.3d at 436. The reasoning of these decisions differ. Some courts view such contacts as
authorized by law. See, e.g., id.; Powe, 9 F.3d at 69. Some courts focus on the strong public interest in
effective law enforcement. See, e.g., Ryans, 903 F.2d at 740; Fitterer, 710 F.2d at 1333. Some courts
reason that the subject matter of the representation is undefined during the investigatory stage, such
that the rule cannot be violated. See, e.g., Ryans, 903 F.2d at 739; United States v. Guerrerio, 675 F.
Supp. 1430, 1438 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
94. See, e.g., State v. Wolf, 643 P.2d 1101, 1105 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Miller, 600 N.W.2d
457, 467 (Minn. 1999); State v. Maloney, 698 N.W.2d 583, 588 (Wis. 2005). This interpretation is not
uniform, however. Some states have interpreted the rule to proscribe certain contacts that are
constitutionally permissible. See People v. White, 567 N.E.2d 1368, 1386 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). For a
discussion of state standards, see generally Schulman, supra note 55, at 1069–70, and Alafair S.R.
Burke, Reconciling Professional Ethics and Prosecutorial Power: The No-Contact Rule Debate, 46
Stan. L. Rev. 1635, 1636 (1994).
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waives his right to consult counsel—in the negative. Comment 3 states
that “[t]he Rule applies even though the represented person initiates or
95
consents to the communication.” In addition, committee notes explain
that Comment 5 was intended to “preclude the notion that an ex parte
communication with a represented person is permitted at the time of
arrest merely because the represented person waives the constitutional
96
right to consult counsel.” The DOJ strongly opposes this position,
however, arguing that if a defendant is deemed capable of waiving his
constitutional right to counsel, he should be deemed capable of waiving
97
the protections of the no-contact rule. Many commentators agree,
contending that represented defendants—who often believe that their
interests will be served by contacting a prosecutor—should be
98
empowered to do so.
A majority of courts reject this position, holding that a defendant
99
cannot waive the no-contact rule’s protections under any circumstances.
100
An often cited example is United States v. Lopez. Under the facts of
that case, a federal prosecutor met with an indicted defendant at the
defendant’s request to discuss a plea bargain. The defendant’s lawyer
had conditioned representation on the defendant foregoing plea
negotiations—an agreement that precluded the defendant from
requesting his lawyer’s consent. After negotiations broke down, the
defense lawyer resigned and successor counsel moved to dismiss the
indictment for violation of the Sixth Amendment and California’s no101
contact rule. Noting that the no-contact rule applies even when a
defendant willingly consents to a communication, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the communication violated the ethical rule but not the

95. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 3 (2008); Carl A. Pierce, Variations on a Basic
Theme: Revisiting the ABA’s Revision of Model Rule 4.2 (Part III), 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 643, 665 (2003)
[hereinafter Pierce, Part III].
96. Pierce, Part III, supra note 95 (quoting Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 reporter’s
observations (Public Discussion Draft, Feb. 21, 2000)).
97. 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 576, 581–84 (1980). The DOJ’s concern can be illustrated by a
defendant, part of an organized crime ring, who wants to offer evidence in exchange for a lighter
sentence. The defendant is represented by a lawyer retained by the crime ring. Fearing the
repercussions, the defendant is unwilling to divulge information without the assurance of
confidentiality. If the no-contact rule applies, the prosecutor will have to forego the information. See
Saylor IV & Wilson, supra note 55, at 459–60.
98. Cramton & Udell, supra note 37, at 298; Pierce, Part III, supra note 95, at 666; Saylor IV &
Wilson, supra note 55, at 471–72.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478,
486–87 (D.N.M. 1992); State v. Morgan, 646 P.2d 1064, 1069–70 (Kan. 1982); People v. Green, 274
N.W.2d 448, 453 (Mich. 1979); see also Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 55, § 38.9 illus. 38.5
(concerning prosecution’s communication with the accused outside the presence of his attorney). But
see United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding defendant can willingly consent
to conversation with the prosecution without his attorney’s presence).
100. 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
101. Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1463.
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102

Sixth Amendment.
In a subsequent formal opinion, the ABA
acknowledged that this approach to defendant-initiated contacts may
seem “paternalistic.” It nevertheless concluded that preventing
uninformed waiver of the rule’s protections is necessary to protect the
103
effectiveness of a lawyer’s representation.
The third issue to be addressed concerns the definition of the phrase
104
“the subject matter of the representation.” Comment 4 of the Model
Rule reveals the significance of this phrase by explaining that “[t]his
Rule does not prohibit communication with a represented person, or an
employee or agent of such a person, concerning matters outside the
105
representation.” The question is whether matters that are outside the
scope of formal charges (and therefore subject to constitutionally
106
permissible inquiries) are also “outside the representation” within the
107
definition of Rule 4.2.
The DOJ views a defendant as represented only on the pending
charges and contends that communication on other matters is therefore
108
Some commentators agree, arguing that government
permissible.
lawyers should be permitted to question a defendant regarding any
109
Courts, meanwhile, have come to
uncharged criminal offenses.
divergent results. Some courts interpret the Rule to prohibit only
communications concerning matters within the scope of the charge. In
United States v. Masullo, for example, the Second Circuit concluded that
federal agents had not violated Rule 4.2 when they questioned a
defendant who was represented on a state narcotics charge regarding

102. Id.
103. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995); see also Hazard,
Jr. & Hodes, supra note 55, § 38.9 illus. 38.5 (“The system as a whole is well served if a lawyer is at
least given the opportunity to counsel his client about waiving his rights.”).
104. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 (2008).
105. Id. cmt. 4 (emphasis added); see also Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct Reference Man.
(ABA/BNA) 71:306 (Oct. 29, 2008) (citing cases).
106. Prosecutorial communications with an accused are constitutionally permissible when
addressing matters that are outside the scope of formal charges, even if the subject matter of the
communication has some kind of transactional relationship to the matters covered in the formal
charge. Specifically, the Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel attaches only regarding the
particular crime charged, and that investigatory contacts regarding crimes for which the right to
counsel has not attached are constitutionally permissible. Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167–72 (2001).
The Court has reasoned that to hold otherwise “would unnecessarily frustrate the public’s interest in
the investigation of criminal activities.” Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985).
107. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. d (2000) (“What
matter or matters are involved in a representation depends on the circumstances.”).
108. See 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 576, 589 (1980) (“The fact that a person has retained counsel
to represent him in one criminal charge would not prohibit interviews concerning unrelated matters.”);
see also Carl A. Pierce, Variations on a Basic Theme: Revisiting the ABA’s Revision of Model Rule 4.2
(Part II), 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 321, 350–51 (2003) [hereinafter Pierce, Part II].
109. See, e.g., Schulman, supra note 55, at 1079–80.
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federal charges for which the defendant was not yet represented. Other
courts take a broader approach, interpreting the Rule to ban
communications concerning transactionally-related matters. In United
States v. Hammad, for example, a violation was based on a prosecutorial
communication regarding an arson investigation with a defendant
111
represented on related charges of Medicare fraud. Still other courts
take the broadest approach possible, interpreting the Rule to ban
communication regarding any and all matters, even if completely
112
unrelated.
Complicating these questions is the issue of Rule 4.2’s proper
application to investigators acting at a lawyer’s direction. Comment 4 of
the Model Rule currently provides that “[a] lawyer may not make a
113
communication prohibited by this Rule through the acts of another.” It
then references Model Rule 8.4, which prohibits a lawyer from violating
114
any ethical rule through the acts of another. Under the prevailing
consensus, these provisions mean that a lawyer cannot advise or direct an
associate, partner, or other agent to engage in communications that
115
would be prohibited if engaged in by the lawyer. They do not mean,
however, that a lawyer cannot advise a client regarding direct
116
communications with another represented person in the matter.
There is disagreement about communications through a third
group—investigators and other law enforcement personnel acting at the
direction of lawyers. Some states allow such communications, at least
117
during the investigatory phase of a case. Other states specify that the
Rule applies to indirect as well as direct communications, and effectively

110. 489 F.2d 217, 222–24 (2d Cir. 1973); see also Johnson v. State, 900 S.W.2d 940, 950 (Ark.
1995); K-Mart Corp. v. Helton, 894 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Ky. 1995); State v. Clawson, 270 S.E.2d 659, 669
(W. Va. 1980).
111. 858 F.2d 834, 840 (2d Cir. 1988).
112. See, e.g., People v. Sharp, 197 Cal. Rptr. 436, 438–39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); In re Burrows, 629
P.2d 820, 824–25 (Or. 1981) (finding that prosecutorial communication about undercover drug
activities with a defendant charged with rape and robbery without his attorney’s presence was a
violation of the no-contact rule); Or. State Bar Op. 484 (Mar. 1983).
113. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 4 (2008); see also Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers § 99(2) cmt. k (2000).
114. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.4(a); see also id. 5.3(c)(1) (prohibiting ordering or
knowingly ratifying conduct by nonlawyer assistant that would be a violation if engaged in by lawyer).
115. See Pierce, Part II, supra note 108, at 338.
116. The comments to the Model Rule specifically authorize clients to communicate directly with
each other and lawyers to advise clients in such communications. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct
R. 4.2 cmt. 4; see also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. k; ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-362 (1992) (indicating lawyers have a duty
to discuss communications the client desires to engage in with the opposing party). Some states’ rules
explicitly authorize lawyers to encourage clients to directly communicate with the adverse party. See
Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct Reference Man. (ABA/BNA) 71:302 (Oct. 29, 2008).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Marcus, 849 F. Supp. 417, 418 (D. Md. 1994); United States v.
Infelise, 773 F. Supp. 93, 95 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
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118

precludes all investigatory contacts. The DOJ argues strenuously with
this position, contending that involving government lawyers in the
planning and execution of law enforcement investigations is desirable
because it will ensure that the investigations comply with the law and
119
afford sufficient respect to the rights of all involved.
We believe it is poor public policy to leave these matters in
continuing debate and uncertainty; doing so jeopardizes legitimacy in law
enforcement. Rule 4.2 should therefore explicitly address its application
to law enforcement investigations. Our proposal is to add a new
subsection (c) to the Rule, which specifies (in part) that: “(c) A
communication is authorized by law when it is in connection with: (1) a
lawful investigation by or under authority of a public law enforcement or
120
regulatory agency.”
To further clarify what constitutes “law” authorizing a
communication under this exception, we propose adding a new sentence
to the relevant Comment, which reads: “Communications authorized by
law include communications that a lawyer is authorized to make under
federal and state constitutional law, statute, agency regulation having the
121
force of law, or decision or rule of a court of competent jurisdiction.”
This articulation of the exception for law enforcement activities strikes
an appropriate balance between the interests served by the Rule
(protection of the target of an investigation), and those served by the
exception (the public’s interest in effective law enforcement). It
acknowledges that when government lawyers comply with constitutional
standards and other law, the government’s interest in efficiently and
effectively investigating crimes outweighs a represented person’s interest
in protection against informal communications. And it recognizes that
the no-contact rule’s proper function is not to protect a represented
person against revelation of all damaging or otherwise probative
evidence, or to prevent the government from acquiring relevant

118. See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 2-100(a) (2008) (“While representing a client, a
member shall not communicate directly or indirectly about the subject of the representation with a
party the member knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the member has
the consent of the other lawyer.”); La. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 (2008) (providing that a
lawyer “shall not effect the prohibited communication through a third person, including the lawyer’s
client”).
119. The DOJ has “encouraged federal prosecutors to play a larger role in pre-indictment, prearrest investigations,” because “greater participation of lawyers at the pre-indictment stage of law
enforcement has been regarded as helpful in assuring that police investigations comply with legal and
ethical standards.” Communications with Represented Persons, 28 C.F.R. § 77 (2008); see also Green
& Zacharias, supra note 52, at 459.
120. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2(c)(1).
121. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2 cmt. 8.
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information. Rather, it is to protect the client-lawyer relationship to the
extent consistent with other valued interests in the legal system.
Moreover,
concluding
that
constitutionally
permissible
communications are ethically permissible recognizes that constitutional
standards emerge from a more rigorous process than do rules of attorney
123
conduct. As one commentator explained:
The cases deciding when suspects are entitled to counsel under the
Sixth Amendment have emerged from the crucible of constitutional
litigation. They are hard cases, requiring the courts to decide, in the
context of murder, kidnapping, sex offenses, organized crime and other
serious anti-social activity, where to draw the line between the [sic]
protecting the rights of suspects, on the one hand, and detecting and
punishing crime, on the other. . . . In those cases, courts face the fact
that the price to be paid for respecting the constitutional rights of
citizens is that, on occasion, a crime will go unpunished, perhaps
forever. . . . [Courts create rules that] explicitly strike a balance
124
between protecting individual rights and punishing criminals.

Ethical rules of attorney conduct, although crafted with careful
deliberation, are the product of a less searching process. They are the
125
product of committees of lawyers and scholars and of judicial approval.
When it comes to striking a proper balance between the rights of
criminal defendants and the interests of society, a persuasive case can be
made that they should be afforded less weight.
As applied, our proposed language will mean that lawful
communications are permissible prior to the initiation of formal
proceedings. After such time, communications will be permissible with a
defendant who has initiated the contact and executed a valid waiver of
the right to counsel. Communications will also be permissible regarding
matters outside the scope of the charges. All such communications will
be subject to the safeguards of proposed Rule 4.2(b), discussed below.
Where government lawyers are prohibited from directly
communicating with a represented person, they should also be prohibited
from communicating through an investigative agent. However, not all
indirect communications should be prohibited. Where an investigator,
122. See, e.g., Humco, Inc. v. Noble, 31 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Ky. 2000) (“The purpose of Rule 4.2 is
‘not to prevent the flow of information, even if damaging to a party in a suit.’ Rather, it is to preserve
the positions of the parties in an adversarial system and thereby to maintain the protections obtained
by employing counsel and prevent disruption of the attorney-client relationship.” (quoting Aiken v.
Bus. & Indus. Health Group, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1474, 1479 (D. Kan. 1995))).
123. Martin S. Murphy, The “No-Contact” Rule and the Sixth Amendment: A Dilemma for the
Ethical Prosecutor, Boston B.J., Mar.–Apr. 1994, at 8.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Geoffrey Hazard, Jr. et al., The Law and Ethics of Lawyering 13–18 (4th
ed. 2005); Carl A. Pierce, Variations on a Basic Theme: Revisiting the ABA’s Revision of Model Rule
4.2 (Part I), 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 121, 123–38 (2002) [hereinafter Pierce, Part I] (describing the
amendment process to Rule 4.2).
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with advice from a lawyer, contacts a represented person in connection
with an undercover sting operation, the Rule’s proper purpose is not
implicated. Applying the Rule in this situation would only serve to
protect the represented person against the disclosure of harmful
information, not against lawyer overreaching or interference with the
lawyer-client relationship. Moreover, as noted by the DOJ, lawyers’
involvement in investigations may actually safeguard the rights of
represented persons because government lawyers are governed by the
special ethical duties prescribed in Model Rule 3.8, which include making
“reasonable efforts to assure that the accused . . . has been given
126
reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel.” Decisional law reinforces
127
these obligations.
B. Communications with Public Officials
Clarifying the “authorized by law” exception in the context of law
enforcement investigations is an important first step in reforming Model
Rule 4.2; a second is clarifying Comment 5’s second illustration of a
communication authorized by law: “communications by a lawyer on
behalf of a client who is exercising a constitutional or other legal right to
128
communicate with the government.” The Restatement (Third) and most
129
states’ no-contact rules include this exception. But here again, there is
no agreement as to the exception’s proper scope.
The primary rationale for the public officials exception derives from
the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of
grievances and the related public interest in open access to
130
government. However, access would be equally “open” (or even more
so) if the Rule required that a government lawyer be notified of any
planned communication with a government official and allowed to be a
party to such communication. A supporting rationale for the exception is
the presumed sophistication of government actors, rendering the Rule’s
protections unnecessary. The Restatement (Third) describes the
126. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(b) (2008).
127. United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 1978) (Ely, J., concurring); H. Richard
Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of
Access and Restraint, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1137, 1176–83 (1987) (noting the prosecutor has “the
paramount professional obligation . . . to promote a just outcome, not a partisan victory”).
128. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 5.
129. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 99(1)(a), 101 & annots. (2000).
130. See, e.g., Am. Canoe Ass’n v. St. Albans, 18 F. Supp. 2d 620, 622 (S.D. W. Va. 1998) (noting
that the right to contact and communicate with government officials is right of citizenship); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-408 n.9 (1997) (noting that Model Rule 4.2
is modified by the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances); see
also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 101 cmt. b (explaining that without
the exception, the no-contact rule’s application could “compromise the public interest in facilitating
direct communication between representatives of citizens and government officials reflected in open
government open-file, freedom of information, and similar enactments”).
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government’s need for the rule’s protection as “dubious,” and the D.C.
Bar Association, in explaining the exception’s origins, has said:
‘Government officials, especially those who have significant decision
making authority, are almost always capable of resisting any arguments
or other suggestions that are not proper and genuinely persuasive.
Moreover, any government official who is in a high enough position to
make binding decisions can surely be relied upon to
exercise . . . individual judgment as to whether to engage in such direct
132
communications at all . . . .’

This may be true in some circumstances, but the argument does not hold
for all government officials. A part-time local school board or zoning
board member might need the rule’s protection as much as any other
133
As the New York City Bar Association
represented individual.
explained, any given public official “may not know exactly what cases are
pending against them, the status of those cases, the consequences of
those cases, or the consequences their statements may have in those
134
cases.”
The variety of legal contexts in which the exception may apply
complicates the task of articulating its contours. A lawyer representing a
private party in a contract dispute may seek to communicate directly with
the government contracting officer who has the authority to resolve or
135
settle the dispute. A lawyer for a private party named as a codefendant with a municipality may want to interview city employees to
136
gather information informally. A lawyer representing an individual
before a licensing board may seek to contact board members directly to
137
present a position. In these and other scenarios, the public’s interest in
open access to government, implicated to varying extents, must be
balanced with the government’s interest in protection against lawyer
overreaching.
Various approaches to this balancing task have been suggested. As
noted, Comment 5 of the Model Rule characterizes communications that

131. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 101 cmt. b.
132. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 340 (2007) (omission in original) (quoting Proposed
Rules of Professional Conduct and Related Comments 187 (1986)).
133. But see Ala. State Bar Gen. Council, Op. 2003-03 (2003) (holding that a lawyer defending
state board of education in suit by county board of education may communicate directly with members
of county board of education to discuss settlement); Kan. Bar Ass’n Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 0006 (2002) (lawyer permitted to contact city officials regarding client’s zoning application
notwithstanding city lawyer’s directive to the contrary because “a citizen must always have access to
his or her government”).
134. N.Y. City Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1991-4 (1991).
135. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 340 (holding contact did not violate D.C. Rules of
Professional Conduct R. 4.2).
136. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1377 (1977).
137. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 280 (1998) (holding proposed contacts did not violate
D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.2).
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are made by lawyers “exercising a constitutional or other legal right to
communicate with the government,” as falling within the “authorized by
138
This vague comment
law” exception to the Rule’s prohibition.
highlights a substantial lack of clarity regarding the constitutional right to
petition for redress of grievances and other legal rights to communicate
with the government. Ultimately, it raises more questions than it
answers.
An ABA formal opinion in 1997 concluded that a lawyer
representing a private party in a suit against the government can
communicate directly with a public official who has authority “to take or
recommend action in the matter of communication” if two conditions are
met: (i) the communication is for the purpose of addressing a policy
issue, and (ii) government counsel is given reasonable advance notice of
139
The ABA opinion concluded that
the intent to communicate.
notwithstanding this exception, Rule 4.2 applies in full force in contexts
“where the right to petition has no apparent applicability, either because
of the position and authority of the official sought to be contacted or
140
because of the purpose of the proposed communication.”
The Restatement (Third) articulates an exception, independent from
the “authorized by law” exception, which permits direct communications
“with employees of a represented governmental agency or with a
governmental officer being represented in the officer’s official
141
capacity.” But the Restatement (Third) then articulates an exception to
this exception: the no-contact rule continues to apply “[i]n negotiation or
litigation by a lawyer of a specific claim of a client against a
governmental agency or against a governmental officer in the officer’s
142
official capacity.” The coherence of this formulation depends on
definitions of “specific claim” and “official capacity.” The Restatement
(Third)’s comment offers little additional guidance regarding the
intended meanings of these phrases, but observes that “[w]hen the
government is represented in a dispute involving a specific claim, the
status of the government as client may be closely analogous to that of
143
any other organizational party.”
Following the Model Rule’s approach, most state bar associations
and courts have accommodated communications with government actors
by recognizing exceptions for communications encompassed by the
vaguely defined constitutional right to petition for redress of

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 5 (2008).
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-408 (1997).
Id.
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 101(1) (2000).
Id. § 101(2) (unless the communication relates to an issue of general policy).
Id. § 101 cmt. c.
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144

grievances. Where the purpose of a communication is not supported by
this constitutional right or by the derivative public policy of open access
to government—for example, where a communication is intended to
elicit admissions from government officials whose alleged conduct forms
the basis for a liability claim—the Rule’s prohibition continues to
145
apply.
In contrast to this majority approach, two jurisdictions—California
and the District of Columbia—have created broad exceptions that cover
146
virtually any communication with a government officer or entity. The
California
rule
provides
that
“[t]his
rule
shall
not
prohibit . . . communications with a public officer, board, committee, or
147
body.” In similarly broad language, the D.C. rule provides that “[t]his
rule does not prohibit communication by a lawyer with government
officials who have the authority to redress the grievances of the lawyer’s
client, whether or not those grievances or the lawyer’s communications
148
relate to matters that are the subject of the representation.” Recently,
the D.C. Bar Ethics Committee clarified that its exception is not limited
to communications regarding government policy; the exception also
149
encompasses communications regarding substantive legal issues.
The California and D.C. rules have the advantage of providing clear
guidance. In doing so, however, they strike a seemingly improper balance
between the implicated interests. They protect an interest in direct access
to government actors at great cost to other implicated interests. An
equally clear rule would be the one suggested in the ABA opinion
referenced above—contact is permissible on notice to the government
attorney.
144. See, e.g., Brown v. Or. Dep’t of Corrs., 173 F.R.D. 265, 267–68 (D. Or. 1997); Alaska Bar
Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 94-1 (1994); Ill. State Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 92-3 (1992); N.Y.
City Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1991-4 (1991); N.C. State Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 202
(1995); S.D. State Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 92-15 (1993); S.D. State Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 90-70
(1990); Tex. State Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 474 (1991); Utah State Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 115
(1993).
145. Brown, 173 F.R.D. at 267–68; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 97-408 n.15 (1997) (noting that the purpose of the contact must be to petition the
government, and cannot be “to elicit admissions or confessions from a low-level government employee
who is in no position to resolve a controversy”).
146. Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 2-100(C)(1) (2008); D.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.
4.2(d) (2007); see also Utah State Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 115.
147. Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 2-100(C)(1).
148. D.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2(d). The rule adds the condition that the lawyer disclose
the lawyer’s identity and role in representing an adverse party. See id. cmt. 11 (explaining that the rule
“is not intended to provide direct access on routine disputes such as ordinary discovery disputes,
extensions of time or other scheduling matters, or similar routine aspects of the resolution of
disputes”).
149. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 340 (2007); see Julia E. Fish, A Practical Solution to the
Government Contacts Problem: Opinion 340 Updates the D.C. Exception to the No-Contact Rule, 21
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 739, 743 (2008).
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We propose a slight variation on this approach. Acknowledging the lack
of clarity as to what contacts are authorized by independent law, we
would create an exception for contact with public officials that is
independent from the “authorized by law” exception and is qualified by
certain procedural safeguards. Specifically, we would allow
communications if one of two conditions is met: (i) the public officer
consents to the communication, or (ii) the communication is written and
a copy is sent to the government lawyer. To effectuate this change, we
propose adding a new paragraph (a) to the text of the Model Rule, which
would state the general prohibition and then list the exceptions. It would
explain that communications are permissible where “the represented
person is a public officer or agency and the communication is either
consented to by the public officer or agency or is in writing with a copy
150
sent to the other lawyer.” This language strikes an appropriate balance
between implicated interests. On the one hand, it facilitates certain direct
communications and prevents government actors from hiding behind the
rule to avoid accountability. It thereby recognizes that a rule of ethics
cannot interfere with the public’s right to petition the government. On
the other hand, it contains procedural safeguards, allowing the public
official an opportunity to consult with counsel before responding to any
direct communication. It thereby accounts for the fact that in some
contexts, public officials need and deserve the rule’s protections as much
as any private actor.
When a state or local government agency is involved, reference
should be made to state constitutional law, instead of or in addition to
federal constitutional law. We therefore propose adding language to the
relevant comment to explain that communications permitted “include
those by a lawyer on behalf of a client who is exercising a constitutional
or other legal right to communicate with the government under Federal
151
or state law.” We also propose adding language to explain that “[t]his
exception does not encompass communications regarding imminent or
pending litigation, nor does it apply to a public official who is potentially
152
personally liable in the matter in question.”
C. Other Communications “Authorized by Law”
As noted, Comment 5 to Model Rule 4.2 offers two illustrations of
communications that may be authorized by law: those in connection with
“certain investigative activities of lawyers representing governmental
entities” and those “by a lawyer on behalf of a client who is exercising a
constitutional or other legal right to communicate with the
150. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2(a)(4).
151. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2 cmt. 11.
152. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2 cmt. 11; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 408 n.2 (1997).
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government.”
Other authorities have recognized additional
communications that may be “authorized by law” and therefore
154
permissible under the no-contact rule. For example, the Restatement
(Third) interprets the exception as allowing a lawyer “to assist a client in
complying with a legal right or responsibility to communicate directly
155
with a represented person.” Under this approach, a lawyer would be
permitted to cause a summons, complaint, or subpoena to be delivered to
a represented person, to make a formal demand on a represented person
as a prerequisite to filing suit, or to deliver notice to a represented person
156
under a private contractual provision. The Restatement (Third) notes
that in all of these situations, requiring a communication to be delivered
through the represented person’s lawyer could give rise to disputes over
157
the effectiveness of delivery. Some states include similar provisions in
the text of their rules. Florida’s rule permits communication “in order to
meet the requirements of any court rule, statute or contract requiring
158
notice or service of process directly on the adverse party,” and
Oregon’s rule permits communication if “a written agreement requires a
159
written notice or demand be sent to such other person.” Both states’
rules require that in such circumstances, a copy be sent to the adverse
party’s lawyer.
Some authorities have suggested that undercover communications
made at the direction of a lawyer to test for illegal practices (“testing”)
160
should also be considered authorized by law and therefore permissible.
153. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 5 (2008).
154. See, e.g., Smith v. Johnson, 711 N.E.2d 1259, 1263 (Ind. 1999) (permitting communication
where rule provided for service of complaint); Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar R. 4-4.2 (2008)
(permitting communication “in order to meet the requirements of any ‘court rule,’ statute or contract
requiring notice or service or process directly on the adverse party”); Or. Code of Prof’l
Responsibility DR 7-104(A)(1)(c) (2003) (permitting communication if “a written agreement requires
a written notice or demand be sent to such other person”); Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. g (2000); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal
Op. 92-362 (1992); Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 55, § 38.4 (noting “many situations in which
clients must or may communicate directly with each other”); see also Ariz. State Bar Rules of Prof’l
Conduct Comm., Op. 2003-02 (2003) (permitting communication where bankruptcy rules required
certain notices be sent directly to parties); Contractual Notice Isn’t ‘Communication’ That Must Go
Through Adversary’s Counsel, 19 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct Current Rep. (ABA/BNA) 456, 456
(2003) (permitting communication as provided under private contract).
155. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. g. Comment 4 to the
Model Rule may intend to incorporate this approach. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2
cmt. 4 (“Also, a lawyer having independent justification or legal authorization for communicating with
a represented person is permitted to do so.”).
156. Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 55, § 38.4.
157. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. g; Hazard, Jr. &
Hodes, supra note 55, § 38.4.
158. Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar R. 4-4.2(a).
159. Or. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 4.2(c) (2006).
160. See generally, e.g., Julian J. Moore, Home Sweet Home: Examining the (Mis)Application of the
Anti-Contact Rule to Housing Discrimination Testers, 25 J. Legal Prof. 75 (2001).
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A tester poses as an applicant to gather evidence of employment,
161
For example,
housing, or public accommodations discrimination.
testers of different races might express interest in purchasing an
apartment to determine whether a prospective seller selects one
applicant over the other on the basis of race. Testing can be used to
detect other types of illegal activity as well, such as unfair competition
162
practices. Notwithstanding testers’ misrepresentation of their identity
and purpose, courts have upheld the legality of their practices and the
163
admissibility of their evidence. Courts have also concluded that lawyer
direction and involvement in the process is authorized by law and
164
therefore permissible under the no-contact rule. These courts recognize
that while legitimating deception is disagreeable, it may sometimes be
necessary. They also recognize that testing practices do not threaten the
165
interests that the no-contact rule seeks to protect. Testers pose as
consumers to gather information that is available to the general public;
166
they do not interfere with the attorney-client relationship.
We think Model Rule 4.2 should explicitly recognize that both of
these categories of communications—communications in connection with
a legal right or responsibility, and testing communications—may be
authorized by law and therefore permissible. Accordingly, we propose
adding language to new subsection (c), explaining that:
(c) A communication is authorized by law when it is in connection
with:
....
(2) transmittal of legally required or permitted notice, such as
service of process; [or]
(3) an investigative procedure permitted by public policy,

161. For a discussion of testing in various contexts, see David B. Isbell and Lucantonio N. Salvi,
Ethical Responsibility of Lawyers for Deception by Undercover Investigators and Discrimination
Testers, 8 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 791, 793 (1995).
162. See Gidatex, S.r.L. v. Campaniello Imps., 82 F. Supp. 2d 119, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Apple
Corps. v. Int’l Collectors Soc’y, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456, 476 (D.N.J. 1998).
163. See Isbell & Salvi, supra note 161, at 799 nn.23–25 (listing cases in which courts upheld the use
of testing in employment, housing, and other contexts).
164. See Hill v. Shell Oil Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 876, 880 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Gidatex, 82 F. Supp. 2d at
120. But see In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966 (Or. 2000) (upholding ban of all undercover operations involving
lawyers).
165. See Richardson v. Howard, 712 F.2d 319, 321–22 (7th Cir. 1983) (observing that the evidence
provided by testers is frequently indispensable and that the requirement of deception is a relatively
small price to pay to defeat racial discrimination); Hamilton v. Miller, 477 F.2d 908, 909–10 n.1 (10th
Cir. 1973) (“It would be difficult indeed to prove discrimination in housing without [the tester’s]
means of gathering evidence.”); see also Apple Corps, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
166. As one court explained in the context of testing for trademark infringement, “[t]he use of
investigators, posing as consumers and speaking to nominal parties who are not involved in any aspect
of the litigation, does not constitute an end-run around the attorney/client privilege.” Gidatex, 82 F.
Supp. 2d at 126.
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notwithstanding that it involves an element of deception, such as
167
by discrimination testers.

New subparagraph (c)(2) follows the lead of the Restatement (Third)
in acknowledging that law and private agreement may not only allow, but
may actively require, direct communication with a represented person.
The no-contact rule should respect this and allow lawyers to assist parties
in exercising any such right or complying with any such responsibility.
For example, a lawyer should be able to assist a client to comply with a
responsibility to deliver notice directly to a represented person.
New subparagraph (c)(3) recognizes that in certain situations,
deception by a lawyer or a lawyer’s agent is desirable on public policy
grounds. As noted in the proposed text, the most prominent example of a
communication that will be permitted under this exception is a
168
These
communication made in connection with testing.
communications, authorized by case law, pose no threat to the clientlawyer relationship. Rather, they serve the important public policy of
detecting illegal practices.
D. Waiver
A represented person’s lawyer, but not a represented person
169
himself, can waive the protections of Model Rule 4.2. If represented
persons have the authority to waive the protections of other ethical
170
rules, the question arises why the same is not true with respect to the
no-contact rule. The answer lies in the logic of the no-contact rule, which
is premised on the notion that a layperson is fatally vulnerable to an
171
opposing lawyer’s importunities.
Accordingly, the rule’s protections cannot be waived by a client,
172
even if the client is sophisticated, and even if the client has good reason
173
for wanting to communicate with another lawyer involved in a matter.
One can envision many such situations. A high-level whistleblower might
want to contact a government lawyer to offer information about the
corporate target of a government investigation. A spouse in a domestic
relations matter might be dissatisfied with counsel and interested in other
or joint representation. A criminal co-defendant, mistrustful of counsel,

167. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2(c)(2)–(3).
168. See Moore, supra note 160.
169. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 (2008); Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers § 99(1)(e) (1998).
170. Most notably, this is the case with certain conflicts of interest. See, e.g., Model Rules of
Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7(b)(4).
171. See In re Waldron, 790 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Mo. 1990) (en banc).
172. See, e.g., Estate of Vafiades v. Sheppard Bus Serv., Inc., 469 A.2d 971, 978 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1983); In re Illuzzi, 616 A.2d 233, 236 (Vt. 1992).
173. See e.g., United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993).
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might want to initiate a conversation with the prosecutor regarding
possible cooperation.
The Model Rule, the Restatement (Third), and case law prohibit
communication in all these situations. Comment 3 to the Model Rule
explains that “[t]he Rule applies even though the represented person
174
initiates or consents to the communication.” The Comment then
instructs a lawyer who is contacted by a represented person to
175
immediately terminate the communication. The Restatement (Third)’s
comments definitively state that the general exception for consent
“requires consent of the opposing lawyer; consent of the client alone
176
does not suffice.”
177
The majority of courts and bar associations hold similarly. In
United States v. Chavez, a defendant wanted to cooperate with the
government and believed that his lawyer was not acting in his best
178
interests. The defendant repeatedly contacted an FBI agent who told
the defendant he needed to inform an attorney or the court if he wanted
179
to speak with the government. The Fourth Circuit suggested that in the
course of these conversations, the agent, acting under a lawyer’s
180
supervision, had violated the Rule. The proper course of action, the
court explained, would have been to terminate the conversation
181
immediately.
By placing complete control of communications in the lawyer’s
hands, this approach presumes the role of the traditional, faithful lawyer.
But fulfillment of this role is contradicted by the very initiative the client
is undertaking—contacting another lawyer after deciding a retained
lawyer is not serving the client’s best interests. The lawyer in such a case
may well “understand” the situation better than the client, but that could

174. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 3 (2008). This comment “makes clear that the
protections accorded by Rule 4.2 may not be waived by the client.” Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct
Reference Man. (ABA/BNA) 71:309 (Oct. 29, 2008) (quoting ABA Report to the House of
Delegates, No. 401, Model Rule 4.2, Reporter’s Observations ¶ 5 (2002)).
175. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 3; see also Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. f (2000).
176. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. b; see also id. cmt. j.
177. See, e.g., Monceret v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 29 S.W.3d 455, 461 (Tenn. 2000); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995); see also ABA Comm. on Prof’l
Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 108 (1934); Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l
and Judicial Ethics, Op. No. 80-46, at 14 (1980).
178. 902 F.2d 259, 262 (4th Cir. 1990).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 266.
181. Id.; see also In re Chan, 271 F. Supp. 2d 539, 543–44 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). See generally Brenna K.
DeVaney, The “No-Contact” Rule: Helping or Hurting Criminal Defendants in Plea Negotiations?, 14
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 933, 933 (2001).
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be the essence of the client’s quandary, as the lawyer could be exploiting
182
the situation to his own advantage, rather than serving the client.
Concluding that a client cannot make a reasonably reliable estimate
of two lawyers’ relative trustworthiness (the client’s and the adversary’s)
183
is, as commentators have noted, paternalistic. It deprives the client of
meaningful choice and, in some representations, of effective
representation. Accordingly, some commentators propose an approach
that would permit client waiver and subsequent direct contact as long as
the represented person’s lawyer is given notice. Even this could be
problematic however, as illustrated by the defendant who is a low-level
participant in a criminal conspiracy, in which the principals hired the
defense lawyer. The defendant would be ill-advised to waive the rule’s
protections and talk to the prosecutor if the defense lawyer would be
informed of the contact. The prototypical example is the “mule” carrier
of drugs whose lawyer has been provided by higher-ups in the drug ring
and who would put himself at great danger if knowledge that he
cooperated with the prosecutor passed back through the defense lawyer
184
to those who retained the lawyer.
In the more prosaic context of civil matters, John Leubsdorf
describes how the lack of a client waiver provision offers unwarranted
protection of lawyers’ interests:
If the lawyer is paid by the hour, he will profit if all communications go
through him. In addition, direct communication with opposing counsel
may reveal to a client that his lawyer is lazy or uninformed, or that the
client’s prospects of success differ from what his lawyer has led him to
believe. These possibilities may well bias the lawyer against consenting
185
to direct communications with his client.

Leubsdorf suggests that the primary way in which the rule elevates
lawyers’ interests above clients’ is by enabling a lawyer to prolong a case
186
by withholding a settlement offer. Doing so would constitute a
187
violation of other ethical duties, but bar associations and courts have
188
held that it does not justify direct contact with a represented person. It
is difficult to defend such a prohibition, particularly if the communication
182. See Judith L. Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 17 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1049 (1984); Mark Spiegel, The New Model Rules of
Professional Conduct: Lawyer-Client Decisionmaking and the Role of Rules in Structuring the LawyerClient Dialogue, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 1003, 1003–04 (1980).
183. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. b; Marcy
Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65
N.C. L. Rev. 315, 321 (1987).
184. See Saylor IV & Wilson, supra note 55, at 459–60.
185. Leubsdorf, supra note 37, at 689–90.
186. Id. at 690.
187. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2(a) (2008).
188. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. f; see also ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1348 (1975).
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is initiated by the represented person or if a copy is sent to the
represented person’s lawyer.
Some commentators would specially exempt corporate
whistleblowers from the rule’s prohibition, so as to encourage their
189
actions. The Ninth Circuit followed this approach where an employee
of a corporate defendant approached the government lawyer to report
she was being pressured to testify falsely. The court noted that “it would
be a perversion of the rule against ex parte contacts to extend it to
protect corporate officers who would suborn perjury by their
190
employees.” Other commentators would exempt communications by
191
criminal defendants who initiate contact with a prosecutor, since
prosecutors have special professional obligations that would serve as a
192
safeguard to the defendant’s legal rights. Still others would exempt
communications by any litigant in a civil or criminal law enforcement
193
proceeding who initiates contact with a government lawyer. If any or
all of these proposals are appropriate and desirable, it is difficult to
justify the absence of a general exception for client-initiated contact.
Stated otherwise, if the argument for client autonomy is persuasive in
some contexts, why is it not persuasive in all contexts?
Finding no convincing answer to this question, and notwithstanding
the majority interpretation to the contrary, we would add a general
exception to Model Rule 4.2 for client waiver. But we would qualify it
with the safeguard that the lawyer must memorialize in writing the
client’s initiation of the communication. Accordingly, we propose
specifying in new paragraph (a) that the Rule’s prohibition does not
apply where “the represented person initiates the communication, a fact
194
that is confirmed in writing.”
Allowing clients to waive the Rule’s protections by initiating
communication is desirable for a number of reasons. It serves client
autonomy. It allows informal contacts where a represented person wants
to cooperate with the adversary, and thereby facilitates fact-finding,
truth-seeking, and dispute resolution. And it limits the extent to which
lawyers can use the Rule to serve their own interests at the expense of
their clients’.
E. Emergencies
Neither Model Rule 4.2 nor typical state formulations of the nocontact rule includes an exception for emergency situations—situations
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See Pierce, Part III, supra note 95, at 645–46.
United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000).
See Pierce, Part III, supra note 95, at 645–46.
See Uviller, supra note 127.
See Pierce, Part III, supra note 95, at 645–46.
See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2(a)(5).
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where direct communications could protect against imminent harm.
Ethical rules addressing attorney-client confidentiality, in contrast,
acknowledge the overriding importance of certain interests in emergency
195
situations. The Comment to Model Rule 1.6, for example, explains that
the duty of confidentiality recognizes, in limited situations “the
overriding value of life and physical integrity and permits disclosure
reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial
196
bodily harm.” And the prevailing exceptions to Rule 1.6 allow the
lawyer to interdict financial harm where the lawyer’s assistance was
197
involved.
One can envision several situations in which a lawyer might want to
contact a represented person directly in order to avert imminent harm. A
lawyer might want to warn a represented person that the lawyer’s client
is likely to engage in violent acts. Or a lawyer might want to
communicate directly with a represented spouse or partner regarding a
child’s whereabouts or health emergency. Recognizing such exigencies,
the Restatement (Third) includes an exception “to protect life or personal
safety and to deal with other emergency situations . . . to the extent
198
reasonably necessary to deal with the emergency.” Model Rule 4.2 has
no such express qualification. Rather, it addresses the issue in Comment
6, which states that an emergency may justify a court order authorizing
199
communication. Obtaining such an order may of course be appropriate
in some situations, but it is insufficient for addressing an immediate risk
of harm.
One would like to think that a conscientious lawyer’s response to
serious emergency would deflect complaint or disciplinary grievance and
that an exception is therefore unnecessary. But the very existence of a
rule that prohibits emergency communications may have a chilling effect.
An express exception should therefore be made. We propose that new
paragraph (a) of the Rule specify that the general prohibition does not
apply where “the communication is necessary in light of what the lawyer
200
reasonably believes to be an emergency.”
In a comment, we propose to elaborate on this exception as follows:
Communications necessary in light of what the lawyer reasonably
believes to be an emergency include communications that the lawyer
believes necessary to address an imminent and reasonably certain risk
of death, substantial bodily harm or compromised personal safety.

195. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 (2008).
196. Id. cmt. 6.
197. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(b).
198. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. i (2000); see also id.
§ 99(1)(d).
199. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 6.
200. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2(a)(3).
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They may also include communications that the lawyer believes
necessary to address an imminent risk of harm to the financial interests
or property of another, in furtherance of which the lawyer’s client used
the lawyer’s services. See Rule 1.6. Where the risk of harm is not
imminent, a lawyer should seek a court order prior to engaging in the
201
communication.

To the end of establishing ethical rules that reflect the fundamental
values of our justice system, this exception would acknowledge that when
in imminent danger, a person’s life and safety outweigh protection of the
client-lawyer relationship. So too does the legal system’s interest in
allowing lawyers to prevent or rectify substantial financial harm created
with their unknowing assistance. This exception would also align Rule
4.2’s exceptions with Rule 1.6’s, creating consistent and mutually
reinforcing ethical standards.
F.

Lawyer Who Is a Party to a Matter
202
Model Rule 4.2 applies when a lawyer is “representing a client.” It
does not specify whether it applies to a lawyer who is acting pro se, such
as a lawyer communicating directly with his landlord in a dispute over a
lease or a lawyer communicating directly with a spouse in a divorce
203
proceeding. In these and similar situations, lawyers have legitimate
interests in being treated like any other party to a matter. Opposing
parties, meanwhile, have legitimate interests in the Rule’s protections.
There is little consensus about the proper approach to these
situations. Model Rule 4.2 is silent on the issue, while the Restatement
(Third) includes an exception for a “lawyer [who] is a party [to the
204
matter] and [who] represents no other client in the matter.” State
courts and ethics committees have split on the issue, some holding that
205
206
the Rule does not apply in such situations, some holding that it does,
and some adopting an intermediate approach. Minnesota, for example,
provides that “a party who is a lawyer may communicate directly with
another party unless expressly instructed to avoid communication by the
201. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2 cmt. 10.
202. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2.
203. See generally Stephen J. Langs, Note, Legal Ethics—The Question of Ex Parte
Communications and Pro Se Lawyers Under Model Rule 4.2—Hey, Can We Talk?, 19 W. New Eng.
L. Rev. 421, 423 (1997); Pierce, Part III, supra note 95.
204. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99(1)(b) (2000); id. § 99 cmt. e.
205. See, e.g., Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 578 A.2d 1075, 1079 (Conn. 1990); Cal.
Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 2-100 annots. (2008) (“[T]he rule does not prohibit a member who is
also a party to a legal matter from directly or indirectly communicating on his or her own behalf with a
represented party.”); Bar Ass’n of N.Y. City, Op. No. 81-8 (1981).
206. See, e.g., Runsvold v. State Bar, 925 P.2d 1118, 1119–20 (Idaho 1996); In re Segall, 509 N.E.2d
988, 990, (Ill. 1987); In re Shaefer, 25 P.3d 191, 199–202 (Nev. 2001); In re Smith, 861 P.2d 1013, 1016–
17 (Or. 1993); Vickery v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241, 259–60 (Tex. App. 1999); In re
Haley, 126 P.3d 1262, 1269, 1275 (Wash. 2006); Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Simmons, 399 S.E.2d 894,
897 (W. Va. 1990); Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103, 108–09 (Wyo. 1994).
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other lawyer[], or unless the other party manifests a desire to
207
communicate only through counsel.” One court has explained that
when proceeding pro se, “[t]he lawyer still has an advantage over the
average layperson, and the integrity of the relationship between the
represented person and counsel is not entitled to less protection merely
208
because the lawyer is appearing pro se.” We agree. A lawyer poses the
same threat to the adverse party whether representing a client,
proceeding pro se, or being represented by another lawyer. In all cases,
the lawyer can use her training in the law to influence or even intimidate
the adverse party and to interfere with the adversary’s client-lawyer
relationship. We therefore propose changing the text of the Rule from
“In representing a client, a lawyer shall not . . . .” to “A lawyer
209
participating in a matter shall not . . . .” We also propose a comment
that states: “This Rule applies to a lawyer who is a party to a proceeding
210
in the same manner as it does to a lawyer representing a client.”
Potential concerns about limiting a lawyer’s routine interactions—
for example, communications with a landlord regarding repairs to an
apartment—are
unwarranted.
Courts,
bar
associations
and
commentators agree that the Rule applies only when a person is
represented in a particular matter. Accordingly, a global claim of
representation in all matters by a lawyer on retainer is insufficient to
211
trigger the Rule’s protection.
G. Organizational Representation
Proper application of the no-contact rule to a represented
organization has been the source of much confusion and debate. The
difficulty stems from an organization’s status as an artificial legal entity
that acts only through its constituents. If the no-contact rule is to afford
protection to organizations, some constituents must qualify as
212
“represented persons” with whom communication is barred. But if
every constituent is a represented person, the rule will not only offer
organizations far greater protection than it offers individuals, it will
impede public law enforcement and private lawsuits.
The basic issue—determining who personifies the “represented
person”—can arise in any dispute involving a represented organization,
be it a corporation, partnership, proprietorship, or any other legal entity.
207. Minn. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 (2007).
208. In re Schaefer, 25 P.3d at 199.
209. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2(a).
210. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2 cmt. 5.
211. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. c (2000); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396, at 13–15 (1995).
212. Niesig v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1035 (N.Y. 1990); see also Stephen A. Saltzburg, Corporate
and Related Attorney-Client Privilege Claims: A Suggested Approach, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 279, 279–85
(1984).
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For example, when the government investigates a corporation, agency
lawyers may want to interview employees informally about possible civil
or criminal violations. The corporation, which will most likely have inhouse and/or outside counsel, will claim that these employees constitute
represented persons and that the interviews are therefore impermissible.
The rule’s task is to draw an appropriate line between those constituents
who can be contacted and those who cannot. Some corporate counsel
have attempted to claim that they always represent all corporate
213
employees, but courts have rejected such claims.
Similar disputes arise in the course of private-party disputes. For
example, a lawyer may want to informally contact witness-employees in a
personal injury action against an employer. If there are no nonemployee
witnesses, informal interviews may be a necessary means of
substantiating the claim before filing suit. The defendant corporation,
however, may contend that the employees are represented persons and
that contact is impermissible. Again, the task is to draw an appropriate
line between those employees who can be contacted and those who
cannot.
The rule should offer corporations the same protection offered to
individuals—protection of the client-lawyer relationship, including the
attorney-client privilege. Corporations and corporate counsel contend
that to do so, the rule must prohibit contact with a broad scope of
214
corporate constituents. But organizational clients are generally more
sophisticated than individual clients and less susceptible to overreaching
by opposing counsel. These considerations weigh in favor of a narrower
215
scope of covered constituents. Also weighing in favor of a narrow scope
is the heightened importance of informal fact-finding in an
organizational context. Informal interviews with employees may be the
only means for a party opposing a represented person to obtain key facts
216
and information. Much information will be in the “exclusive control” of
the organization and its employees, and may not be produced through
217
formal discovery. Moreover, employees who would have offered

213. See, e.g., Harry A. v. Duncan, 330 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1137–38 (D. Mont. 2004); Banks v. Office
of Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, 222 F.R.D. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2004); Michaels v. Woodland, 988 F. Supp. 468,
472 (D.N.J. 1997); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396
(1995).
214. See, e.g., Samuel R. Miller & Angelo J. Calfo, Ex Parte Contact with Employees and Former
Employees of a Corporate Adversary: Is It Ethical?, 42 Bus. Law. 1053 (1987).
215. See, e.g., Johnson v. Cadillac Plastic Group, 930 F. Supp. 1437, 1440–42 (D. Colo. 1996);
Weider Sports Equip. Co. v. Fitness First, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 502, 508–09 (D. Utah 1996).
216. See Hanntz v. Shiley, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 258, 258 (D.N.J. 1991); Niesig v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d
1030 (N.Y. 1990) (noting that prohibiting communication with employees “closes off avenues of
informal discovery of information that may serve both the litigants and the entire justice system by
uncovering relevant facts”); Sinaiko, supra note 27, at 1477–79.
217. See Wright ex rel. Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 568 (Wash. 1984).
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prejudicial information in an informal private environment may be
hesitant to do so in front of the corporation’s lawyer for fear of
retaliation. Accordingly, as the New York Court of Appeals explained,
“[t]he broader the definition of ‘party’ in the interests of fairness to the
corporation, the greater the cost in terms of foreclosing vital informal
218
access to facts.”
Moreover, limiting informal discovery imposes additional burdens in
the organizational context. By increasing the costs of litigation through
formal discovery, it may preclude the possibility of suit for individual
219
plaintiffs who often have comparatively fewer resources. And by
precluding individual plaintiffs’ access to vital sources of information, it
may discourage lawsuits, frustrating private litigation’s role as an
“important means of controlling abuses of corporate power and
220
restraining abuses of law.”
The interests of the organization’s constituents further complicate
the issue. An employee’s interests may well diverge from those of the
organization. For example, an employee may determine that it is in his
best interest to cooperate with a government lawyer investigating
possible corporate wrongdoing. If the employee qualifies as a
represented person, he will not be able to contact the government lawyer
221
without the consent of the corporation’s lawyer. Nor will he have the
escape valve of firing his lawyer—an option, albeit it extreme, that
represented individuals can make use of if their lawyers unreasonably
withhold consent. In the end, neither the employee’s interest in
cooperating, nor the legal system’s interest in addressing corporate
wrongdoing, will be served.
Prior to the 1995 amendments, the Model Rule did not offer
guidance as to how to balance these interests and determine the proper
scope of the Rule in the organizational context. The text of the Model
Rule still does not do so, but Comment 7 identifies three classes of an
organization’s constituents with whom direct contact is prohibited:
In the case of a represented organization, this Rule prohibits
communications with a constituent of the organization who supervises,
directs or regularly consults with the organization’s lawyer concerning
218. Niesig, 558 N.E.2d at 1033; see also Bouge v. Smith’s Mgmt. Corp., 132 F.R.D. 560, 565 (D.
Utah 1990).
219. See Frey v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 106 F.R.D. 32, 36 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (“[It] may
well frustrate the right of an individual plaintiff with limited resources to a fair trial and deter other
litigants from pursuing their legal remedies.”).
220. Bouge, 132 F.R.D. at 565.
221. See, e.g., John G. Douglass, Jimmy Hoffa’s Revenge: White-Collar Rights Under the McDade
Amendment, 11 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 123, 148 (2002) (explaining that in plea negotiations
between the government and a corporate target of an investigation, the price of the bargain is often is
a waiver of corporate privilege; individual constituents who had confidential communications with
corporate counsel are then “left out in the cold”).
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the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to
the matter or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may
be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal
222
liability.

The first category of constituents, which is also incorporated in the
223
Restatement (Third)’s version, covers those individuals who regularly
interact with the corporation’s lawyer and are therefore likely to be privy
224
to privileged and confidential information. The second category, which
may substantially overlap with the first, covers those individuals who can
commit the organization to settlement and other major decisions with
respect to the matter. Both of these categories can be difficult to apply,
particularly for an outside lawyer who will not know at the time of an
interview whether a constituent has the authority to obligate the
225
organization.
The third category of constituents, also included in the Restatement
226
(Third)’s formulation, includes those whose actions may be imputed to
the organization for purposes of liability. This category appropriately
includes individuals who have “acted in the matter on behalf of the
organization, and save for the separate legal character of the
organizational form, would often be directly named as a party in a
227
lawsuit involving the matter.” In the out-of-court context, this category
may be as difficult to apply as the first two. A lawyer may not know the
legal theory of the case at the time of the interview, making it impossible
to determine whose conduct might be imputed to the organization for
228
purposes of liability. A further shortcoming of this category is its
potentially great breadth, since “things that are wholly innocent, such as
record keeping, may be imputed to the organization in order to establish
229
its liability for the conduct of other employees.”
The pre-2002 version of the Model Rule extended protection to
employees whose statements could “constitute an admission on the part
230
This standard was ambiguous because of
of the organization.”
222. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2008).
223. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 100 & cmt. c (2000).
224. See Pierce, Part I, supra note 125, at 156.
225. Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 55, § 38.26; Ernest F. Lidge III, The Ethics of
Communicating with an Organization’s Employees: an Analysis of The Unworkable “Hybrid” of
“Multifactor” Managing-Speaking Agent, ABA, and Niesig Tests and a Proposal for a “Supervisor”
Standard, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 801, 830–31 (1993).
226. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 100(2)(b) cmt. d. While
adopting this prong, the Restatement (Third) also criticizes it, noting its meaning “is unclear and has
been variously interpreted. Any employee’s or agent’s act may be ‘imputed’ to the organization for
many legal purposes.” Id.
227. Id.; see also Pierce, Part I, supra note 125, at 167.
228. Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 55, § 38.26; Lidge III, supra note 225, at 848.
229. This position is summarized in Pierce, Part I, supra note 125, at 167–68.
230. Compare Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 4 (1995) (specifying that consent of an
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uncertainty in the evidentiary rule to which it referred. It was likely
intended to refer to evidentiary rules of some jurisdictions that provided
that statements by certain employees were admissible against the
231
organization and could not be controverted, i.e., were “binding.” Many
courts, however, read it as referencing the party admission exception to
232
the hearsay rules. The common law hearsay rule provides that an
employee’s statement, although not “binding” on the employer, is
admissible against an employer to prove the truth of the matter asserted
“if the agent was authorized to make the statement or was authorized to
make, on the principal’s behalf, any statements concerning the subject
233
matter.” The federal evidentiary rule and those in many states
liberalized this common law test, allowing the admission of a statement
234
by an employee if it involved a matter within the scope of employment.
Depending on a jurisdiction’s rules of evidence, this provision can
therefore create an extremely broad prohibition on informal
235
236
communications. The Model Rule now rejects this approach. The
Restatement (Third), meanwhile, adopts the “binding admission” version,
phrasing the rule as prohibiting communication “if a statement of the
employee or other agent, under applicable rules of evidence, would have
the effect of binding the organization with respect to proof of the
237
matter.” The Restatement (Third)’s comment explains this standard is
designed to preclude communications by constituents who have the
power to make statements the principal cannot thereafter contradict, but
not communications with individuals solely because their statements are
238
admissible under the hearsay rule.
Neither the Model Rule’s nor the Restatement (Third)’s approach
have been uniformly adopted by states. In fact, state standards vary
significantly. Some states continue to follow approaches developed prior
to the Model Rule and the Restatement (Third), while others have
organization’s lawyer was required for communication with a person “whose statement may constitute
an admission on the part of the organization”), with Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 7
(2002) (eliminating such provision).
231. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 100(2)(b) cmt. e.
232. See, e.g., Weibrecht v. S. Ill. Transfer Inc., 241 F.3d 875, 883 (7th Cir. 2001); Paulson v.
Plainfield Trucking, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 654, 656 (D. Minn. 2002); Midwest Motor Sports, Inc. v. Arctic
Cat Sales, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1155–57 (D.S.D. 2001); Brown v. St. Joseph County, 148 F.R.D.
246, 254 (N.D. Ind. 1996); Cole v. Appalachian Power Co., 903 F. Supp. 975, 976 (S.D. W. Va. 1995).
233. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 286 (1958).
234. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) (employee’s statement constitutes an admission if it is
“concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the
relationship”).
235. Messing, Rudavsky & Weliky, P.C. v. Pres. & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 764 N.E.2d 825, 833
(Mass. 2002) (noting test would “effectively prohibit the questioning of all employees who can offer
information helpful to the litigation”).
236. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2008)
237. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 100(2)(c) (2000).
238. Id. § 100(2) cmt. e.

836

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:797

rejected the Model Rule and Restatement (Third) and developed
different standards. All formulations have shortcomings. At one end of
the spectrum of state approaches is the “control group” test, which
prohibits communications only with “those top management persons
who had the responsibility of making final decisions and those employees
whose advisory roles to top management are such that a decision would
not normally be made without those persons’ advice or opinion or whose
239
opinions in fact form the basis of any final decision.” Correlatively,
informal contacts and interviews are permissible with all employees who
are not part of upper level management. This test has been heavily
240
criticized for providing corporations with insufficient protection and for
241
lacking predictability. Prior to an interview, it will often be difficult for
opposing counsel to determine which employees fall within a
242
corporation’s control group.
At the opposite end of the spectrum of state approaches is a blanket
243
rule that bans communication with all corporate employees. This test
provides certainty and absolute protection to the corporation, but at the
244
expense of all informal fact-finding and resulting access to information.
245
Virtually all authorities now reject this approach.
Some courts have concluded that it is impossible to formulate a test
246
to differentiate between employees who can and cannot be contacted.
In Mompoint v. Lotus Development Corporation, a district court
balanced a variety of factors, including the corporation’s interest in
protecting itself and the opposing parties’ interest in discovering the facts
247
of the case. This approach, which the court labeled a case-by-case
balancing test, provides flexibility to be sure. But “flexibility” is a soft
word for “ambiguity,” and it remains uncertain which corporate
constituents can be contacted.

239. Fair Auto. Repair, Inc. v. Car-X Serv. Sys., Inc., 471 N.E.2d 554, 560 (Ill. 1984); see also B.H.
ex rel. Monahan v. Johnson, 128 F.R.D. 659, 663 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
240. Niesig v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1032–35 (N.Y. 1990); Hume, supra note 27, at 980–81;
Lidge III, supra note 225, at 815; Saltzburg, supra note 212; Sinaiko, supra note 27, at 1483.
241. N.Y.C. Bar Inquiry Ref. No. 80-46, supra note 17; see also Hume, supra note 27, at 980–81;
Krulewitch, supra note 33, at 1287.
242. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (“Disparate decisions in cases applying
this test illustrate its unpredictability.”).
243. See, e.g., Tucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 849 F. Supp. 1096, 1099–101 (E.D. Va. 1994);
McCallum v. CSX Transp., Inc., 149 F.R.D. 104, 110 (M.D.N.C. 1993); Public Serv. Elec. & Gas. Co. v.
Assoc. Elec. & Gas Ins. Serv., Ltd., 745 F. Supp. 1037, 1042 (D.N.J. 1990).
244. Niesig, 558 N.E.2d at 1039; Miller & Calfo, supra note 214, at 1072.
245. See Niesig, 558 N.E.2d at 1039; Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
§ 100(2) cmt. b (2000); Hume, supra note 27, at 973.
246. See, e.g., Morrison v. Brandeis Univ., 125 F.R.D. 14, 15 (D. Mass. 1989); Mompoint v. Lotus
Dev. Corp., 110 F.R.D. 414, 418 (D. Mass 1986).
247. Mompoint, 110 F.R.D. at 418.
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A standard that has gained much support is the “managing-speaking
agent” test. This test defines the constituents who cannot be contacted as
those who are managers or who are authorized to speak on behalf of the
248
corporation in the matter in question, and extends the rule’s coverage
beyond the control group but not to lower level employees. In adopting
this formulation, the Supreme Court of Washington explained that it
“served both to protect represented parties from the dangers of dealing
with adverse counsel and to preserve the accessibility of testimony of
249
employee witnesses.”
Some variation of the managing-speaking agent test may be the best
means of differentiating between employees who can and cannot be
250
contacted. This test acknowledges and balances competing interests,
while offering more predictable guidance than a case-by-case balancing
approach. Like the other approaches, however, it has deficiencies. Some
commentators contend that it fails to provide the corporation sufficient
protection, since middle and lower level employees often have
251
information that can be highly damaging, and statements of those
whose acts or omissions gave rise to litigation, regardless of their
position, might constitute evidentiary admissions against the corporation.
Also, it may be difficult to apply, as it will often be difficult for a lawyer
to determine prior to an interview whether a particular constituent is in a
252
forbidden category.
Addressing some of these concerns is a test adopted by the New
York Court of Appeals in Niesig v. Team I, which prohibits
communication with those constituents whose acts or omissions in the
matter are binding on the corporation, who are responsible for
implementing the advice of counsel, or whose interests are directly at
253
254
stake. All other employees may be interviewed informally. Another
approach that addresses some of these concerns is that adopted by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Messing, Rudavsky & Weliky,
255
P.C. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College. The court set forth
three categories of employees with whom a lawyer cannot communicate
directly: those who exercise managerial responsibility with regard to the
subject matter of the litigation, those who are alleged to have committed
248. See Wright ex rel. Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 569 (Wash. 1984); see also
Palmer v. Pioneer Inn Assoc., Ltd., 59 P.3d 1237, 1247 (Nev. 2002).
249. Wright, 691 P.2d at 564.
250. See, e.g., Krulewitch, supra note 33, at 1298; Lidge III, supra note 225, at 804 (noting the
emerging trend of adopting a multifactor test such as the managing speaking agent test); Sinaiko,
supra note 27, at 1486.
251. Sinaiko, supra note 27, at 1487.
252. Lidge III, supra note 225, at 830–31.
253. 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1035 (N.Y. 1990).
254. Id.
255. 764 N.E.2d 825 (Mass. 2002).
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the wrongful acts at issue in the litigation, and those who have the
256
authority to make decisions about the course of the litigation. The
approaches of both Niesig and Fellows of Harvard College recognize
Rule 4.2’s role in protecting the client-lawyer relationship by focusing
attention on the employee’s relationship with the organization’s lawyer.
They also offer the corporation somewhat more protection than the
“managing-speaking agent” test by extending coverage to employees
who have no power to bind the organization and no direct role in the
client-lawyer relationship, but who nevertheless could severely impair
the effectiveness of representation through conversations with opposing
counsel.
The revisions to the Model Rule in 1995 to address these issues in a
comment, and in 2002 to eliminate the reference to admissions, were
positive steps. However, the text itself should address the issue. We
believe it should do so in a manner that adopts the strengths of the Niesig
and Fellows of Harvard College approaches. Accordingly, we propose to
add the following paragraph to the text of Model Rule 4.2:
(d) Where an organization is represented by a lawyer in a matter,
this Rule applies to communication with a current constituent of the
organization:
(1) who supervises or directs the organization’s lawyer;
(2) who substantially participates in, or has authority to obligate
the organization with respect to, the representation; or
(3) whose acts or omissions materially contributed to the matter
257
underlying the representation.

In articulating this standard, we are mindful that the Rule’s proper
function is not to protect the organization against disclosure of harmful
258
but nonprivileged information. Rather, it is to protect the client-lawyer
relationship and the attorney-client privilege that is at the core of that
259
relationship. Accordingly, the first two proposed prongs focus on
constituents who will have regular and substantial interaction with the
organization’s lawyer and who embody the organization in dealing with
the lawyer—those who supervise or direct the lawyer, and those who
substantially participate in the representation or have the authority to
obligate the organization in the representation.
Leaving the Rule’s coverage at those constituents who regularly
interact with the organization’s lawyer would exclude a set of
constituents covered by some current formulations of the Rule—those
256. Id. at 833.
257. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2(d).
258. See Wright ex rel. Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 569 (Wash. 1984) (“It is not
the purpose of the rule to protect a corporate party from the revelation of prejudicial facts.”).
259. Id.
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who played a role in the matter underlying the representation. Initially,
this exclusion seems consistent with the Rule’s purpose of protecting the
client-lawyer relationship. That the constituent’s conduct provided the
basis for the legal matter does not, by itself, mean that communication
with that person will threaten the organization’s client-lawyer
relationship. But the difficulties of organizational representation—of the
entity as an artificial construct—and the goal of approximating the
protection offered by the Rule to individuals necessitate including
individuals who were directly involved in the underlying matter. These
constituents may not regularly interact with the lawyer, but they play a
key role in the lawyer’s strategy and effective representation. Allowing
informal communications with such individuals could allow opposing
counsel to exert inappropriate influence, leading the individual to make
damaging statements and to undermine the lawyer’s legal representation
or strategy without the lawyer’s knowledge.
As discussed, the Model Rule’s current standard includes these
individuals within the Rule’s scope by including those constituents whose
acts “may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal
260
liability.” Also as discussed, this formulation is problematic because of
the difficulty of determining whose conduct may be imputed for purposes
of the applicable legal theory of liability. To signal that the test is not a
precise legal inquiry, but rather asks a lawyer to exercise common sense
in determining which individuals likely played a substantial role in the
underlying matter, we use the language: “whose acts or omissions
261
materially contributed to the matter underlying the representation.”
Crucial to the effectiveness of this inquiry will be clarifying the
262
relevant knowledge standard.
Neither the text nor the relevant
comment specifies a knowledge standard, but the implication is that of
263
“actual knowledge” that the person is represented in the matter. That
standard may diminish the Rule’s protections, since it will rarely be the
case that prior to an interview, a lawyer will have actual knowledge that a
constituent has authority to obligate an organization or that a
constituent’s conduct will be imputed to the organization for purposes of
liability. One means of addressing this problem is to impose a duty to
inquire about an employee’s status within the organization before a

260. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2008).
261. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2(d)(3).
262. See, e.g., Susan J. Becker, Discovery of Information and Documents from a Litigant’s Former
Employees: Synergy and Synthesis of Civil Rules, Ethical Standards, Privilege Doctrines, and Common
Law Principles, 81 Neb. L. Rev. 868, 896–97 (2003).
263. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 8 (“The prohibition . . . only applies in
circumstances where the lawyer knows that the person is in fact represented in the matter to be
discussed.”).
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lawyer may communicate with the employee directly. A California court,
for example, has explained:
[I]n cases where an attorney has reason to believe that an employee of
a represented organization might be covered by [the no-contact rule],
that attorney would be well advised to either conduct discovery or
communicate with opposing counsel concerning the employee’s status
before contacting the employee. A failure to do so may, along with
other facts, constitute circumstantial evidence that an attorney had
264
actual knowledge . . . .

Another means of addressing the problem is to relax the actual
knowledge standard for determining covered constituents. New Jersey’s
rule, for example, prohibits communication with anyone the lawyer
“knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, to be
265
represented by another lawyer in the matter.” The rule further
specifies that “[r]easonable diligence shall include, but not be limited to,
a specific inquiry of the person as to whether that person is represented
266
by counsel.” Following this approach, we propose to clarify the
knowledge standard in the relevant comment as follows:
In the context of organizational representation, the prohibition on
communications applies where the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know that a constituent is in a position within the organization to be
classified as a represented person. This means that the lawyer has
actual knowledge of the constituent’s position or that a lawyer of
reasonable prudence and competence would have actual knowledge in
267
the same circumstances. See Rule 1.0(j).

The discussion thus far has not distinguished between current and
former employees. A few states have concluded that Rule 4.2’s
268
prohibition applies to former employees, but the weight of authority
holds that former employees are outside the scope of the Rule. The
269
270
271
Model Rule, the Restatement (Third), and most courts permit
264. Snider v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 119, 139 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
265. Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct Reference Man. (ABA/BNA) 71:302 (Oct. 29, 2008).
266. Id.
267. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2 cmt. 13.
268. See, e.g., Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Assoc. Elec. & Gas Ins. Serv., Ltd., 745 F. Supp.
1037, 1039 (D.N.J. 1990); Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Md. Cup Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36, 40 (D. Mass. 1987);
Porter v. Arco Metals Co., 642 F. Supp. 1116, 1118 (D. Mont. 1986); Kan. Bar Ass’n, Formal Advisory
Op. 92-07 (1991).
269. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2008) (amended in 2002 to specify that
consent of an organization’s lawyer is not required for communications with former constituents).
270. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 100, cmt. g (2000). But see id.
(noting that direct communication may not be appropriate in certain circumstances, such as if the
former employee continues to consult with the entity’s attorney).
271. See, e.g., Valassis v. Samuelson, 143 F.R.D. 118, 123 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Curley v. Cumberland
Farms, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 77, 83 (D.N.J. 1991); Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621,
629 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); H.B.A. Mgmt. Inc. v. Estate of Schwartz, 693 So. 2d 541, 544 (Fla. 1997); Humco,
Inc. v. Noble, 31 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Ky. 2000); Clark v. Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc., 797
N.E.2d 905, 908 (Mass. 2003); Muriel Siebert & Co. v. Intuit, Inc., 868 N.E.2d 208, 210–11 (N.Y. 2007);
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communications with former employees. These authorities generally
assert that once a constituent’s affiliation with an organization ceases,
there is a greatly diminished risk that communications with that person
272
will harm the organization’s client-lawyer relationship. This is only
partially true, however. A former employee could make damaging
statements that weaken the scope of the attorney-client privilege and
undermine the lawyer’s strategy without the lawyer’s knowledge—for
example, if a former employee is in regular contact with corporate
counsel and holds confidential information, or if a former employee’s
273
conduct is at the base of the dispute. Moreover, there is little principled
reason, and little support in the language of Rule 4.2, for distinguishing
between current and former employees whose conduct may be imputed
to the organization for purposes of liability. Recognizing this, some
courts have qualified or restricted communication with former
employees in certain respects. Some courts allow direct communications,
but with the reminder that the lawyer should not seek to acquire
274
privileged information. Other courts prohibit communication if the
former employee had been privy to confidential or privileged
275
information, or if the former employee’s conduct could be imputed to
276
the organization for purposes of liability.
We agree with the majority position that communications with
former employees should generally be permissible. Once an employee
ceases association with an organization, there is diminished risk of
interference with the organization’s client-lawyer relationship. But we
recognize that in certain situations, informal communications with
former employees could threaten the policies underlying the Rule no less
than communications with current employees. If Model Rule 4.2 is to
approximate the protection it affords to an individual when it is applied
to an organization, it should acknowledge this potential threat.
Accordingly, we propose replacing the sentence in current Comment 7,
explaining that communications with former employees are permitted,
with the following:
Wright ex rel. Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 570 (Wash. 1984); see also Becker, supra
note 262, at 898 n.147 (citing cases).
272. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 359 (1991); Benjamin
Lloyd Lindquist, Ethical Considerations in Model Rule 4.2’s Application to the Corporate Litigant, 20 J.
Legal Prof. 267, 272–74 (1996).
273. Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 55, § 38.7.
274. See, e.g., Smith v. Kalamazoo Ophthalmology, 322 F. Supp. 2d 883, 890 (W.D. Mich. 2004);
FleetBoston Robertson Stephens, Inc. v. Innovex, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1195 (D. Minn. 2001);
P.T. Barnum’s Nightclub v. Duhamell, 766 N.E.2d 729, 737 (Ind. 2002).
275. See, e.g., Kaiser v. AT&T, No. CIV 00-724-PHX JWS, 2002 WL 1362054, at *6 (D. Ariz. Apr.
5, 2002); Camden v. State of Md., 910 F. Supp. 1115, 1121 (D. Md. 1996); Rentclub, Inc. v.
Transamerica Rental Fin. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 651, 658 (M.D. Fla. 1992); Polycast Tech. Corp. v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
276. See, e.g., Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250, 253 (D. Kan. 1988).
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In the case of a represented organization, consent of the organization’s
lawyer is not required for communication with a former constituent
unless the former constituent is represented by the organization’s
lawyer through an independent engagement or unless a lawyer knows
or reasonably should know that the former constituent’s conduct
materially contributed to the matter underlying the representation. In
communicating with a former constituent, a lawyer shall not seek to
277
elicit privileged or confidential information.

H. Class Actions
A final context in which Rule 4.2’s proper application is unclear is
class action lawsuits. The Model Rule does not mention class actions, but
the Restatement (Third) summarizes the prevailing consensus that once a
class has been certified, an opposing lawyer cannot contact a class
278
member directly without the consent of class counsel. This is based on
the notion that like any represented individual, a represented class
member deserves the protection of the no-contact rule. The Restatement
(Third) does not address the more difficult question of application of the
279
rule after a class action has been filed but prior to certification. During
such period, a lawyer for the “target” of the suit may want to contact
putative class members to gather information, to try to initiate
settlement, or to communicate on a related subject where the target and
the class members have a continuing relationship such as employeremployee. A lawyer for a competing putative class may want to contact
putative class members to recruit them.
Courts
and
commentators
that
have
addressed
postfiling/precertification scenarios have drawn divergent conclusions.
Most argue that until a class is certified, application of the rule cannot be
justified. Applying the rule would grant class counsel control over the
communications of individuals who did not choose to be represented by
class counsel, did not consent to membership in the class, and may not
280
even know about the class. Others contend that a lawyer filing a class
action has fiduciary duties to unnamed and even unknown putative

277. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2 cmt. 6.
278. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. l (2000); Hazard, Jr. &
Hodes, supra note 55, § 38.4 illus. 38-1; Debra Lyn Bassett, Pre-Certification Communication Ethics in
Class Actions, 36 Ga. L. Rev. 353, 355 (2002) (summarizing consensus); Vincent R. Johnson, The
Ethics of Communicating with Putative Class Members, 17 Rev. Litig. 497, 505–06 (1998).
279. Bassett, supra note 278, at 355–56 (contending that prior to certification, it is “less well clear”
whether a lawyer-client relationship exists between class counsel and all class members, but noting the
majority view in the negative).
280. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. l; Johnson,
supra note 278, at 507. For a discussion of the difficulties of defining the attorney client relationship in
the context of class action representations, see ALI, Principles of the Law of Aggregate
Litigation § 1.05, cmts. f–h (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2008).
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members of the class, which form the basis of a quasi–client-lawyer
281
relationship that should be protected by the rule.
Another difficult question is proper application of the rule after
certification of a class but prior to expiration of the opt-out period. Some
282
Some
courts have allowed communications in these situations.
commentators contend that allowing opposing counsel to contact
putative class members during this period may benefit the putative class
members, who have an interest in any information that will aid in their
decision whether to opt out of the class. One commentator argues that
the court’s certification of a class should be analogized to “a judicially
approved offer from the lawyer to the class members to maintain the
283
lawsuit on their behalf.” Accordingly, “given that the choice with
respect to membership in the class is left to the class member until the
expiration of the exclusion period, the right to control communication
284
about the class action should be left to that individual class member.”
Others have suggested that communications should not be permitted
285
during the opt-out period. They note the frequency of “abusive
communications” by defense counsel, including “misrepresentations
concerning the class action’s purpose, status, or effects, as well as threats
286
or other forms of coercion.”
Model Rule 4.2, currently silent on these issues, should offer
guidance. We propose to clarify that the Rule does not apply prior to
certification or after certification but prior to expiration of an opt-out
period. Prior to certification, putative class members should be in full
control of their communications with both appointed class counsel and
any other lawyers who are involved in the matter. We find the same
reasoning persuasive with respect to the period after certification but
prior to the expiration of an opt-out period. At such time, class members
should be in full control of their communications.
In order to implement these proposed applications of Rule 4.2 to
class action lawsuits, we propose a comment that states:
Once a proceeding has been certified as a class action and any optout period has expired, members of the class are considered
represented persons for purposes of this Rule. Prior to that time, only
those members of the class with whom the class’s lawyer maintains a
personal client-lawyer relationship are considered represented
287
persons.

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 278, at 410.
See, e.g., St. Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-219 (1994).
Pierce, Part I, supra note 125, at 189.
Id.
See, e.g., Impervious Paint Ind., Inc., v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 724 (W.D. Ky. 1981).
Bassett, supra note 278, at 403–04.
See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2 cmt. 7.
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I.

Guidance for Communications that Are Permitted
Our proposed modifications will increase the number of direct
communications that are permitted under Rule 4.2. Our final proposed
change to the Rule’s text emphasizes that in the course of all permissible
communications, a lawyer is prohibited from taking any action that will
undermine the effectiveness of the represented person’s client-lawyer
relationship, such as seeking information covered by the attorney-client
privilege, causing the represented person to doubt a lawyer’s
288
effectiveness, or negotiating a settlement with the represented person.
Already, Rule 4.4 requires attorneys to refrain from “using methods of
289
obtaining evidence that violate the rights of third persons.” Case law
has interpreted this provision as requiring attorneys engaging in ex parte
communication to take precautions against disclosures of privileged
290
In addition, we propose adding the following new
information.
paragraph to Model Rule 4.2’s text:
(b) A lawyer engaged in communication permitted by this Rule shall
not seek or obtain information protected by the attorney-client
privilege or work-product immunity, and shall comply with the
291
standard of conduct set forth in Rule 4.3.

Model Rule 4.3, which addresses communications by unrepresented
persons, requires a lawyer to identify her role in a matter and her client if
292
doing so is necessary to avoid a misunderstanding. In a comment, we
propose to clarify that this identification requirement will not apply in
certain undercover investigatory activities, to ensure that this provision
does not conflict with certain investigatory communications that are
293
authorized by law and therefore permissible under the Rule.

Conclusion
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the dominant formulation
of the no-contact rule, represented by Model Rule 4.2, is inadequate to
address many situations that arise in modern legal practice. Some of
these problems arise because the rule’s proper application is unclear;
others because the rule’s application is undesirable. All of these

288. See, e.g., Orlowski v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 723, 728 (N.D. Ill. 1996); S.C.
Ethics Op. 01-01 (2001); District of Columbia’s Lawyers May Contact Opponent’s Unrepresented
Former Employees, 15 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct Current Rep. (ABA/BNA) 67, 67–68 (1999); Ex
Parte Interview of Former Employee May Not Probe Talks with Corporate Counsel, 17 Laws. Man. on
Prof. Conduct Current Rep. (ABA/BNA) 256, 256 (2001).
289. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.4 (2008).
290. Dubois v. Gradco Sys., Inc., 136 F.R.D. 341, 347 (D. Conn. 1991); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-359 (1991).
291. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2(b).
292. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.3.
293. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2 cmt. 14.
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problems are rooted in the breadth of Model Rule 4.2’s prohibition and
the open-ended terms of its exceptions.
Just as other ethical rules have been modified and qualified to
acknowledge and balance competing duties and interests, so too should
the no-contact rule be reformed. In furtherance of this goal, this Article
has proposed modifications to the text and comments of Model Rule 4.2,
the full amended version of which can be found in Appendix 2. The
proposed changes to the text: (1) clarify the meaning of the “authorized
by law” exception, (2) articulate new exceptions to the Rule to avoid
unjust applications, (3) revise the test for application of the Rule in the
organizational context, and (4) offer guidelines for communications that
occur under any of the Rule’s exceptions. The proposed changes to the
comments clarify these modifications to the Rule’s text and, among other
things, offer guidance as to the Rule’s application to lawyers who are
parties to a matter and to class actions. Together, these changes aim to
implement the no-contact rule’s proper purpose—protecting the clientlawyer relationship to the greatest extent consistent with legitimate
implicated interests—those of the client, the adversary, the court, and the
legal system as a whole.
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Appendix 1: ABA Model Rule 4.2
Communication with Person Represented by Counsel
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court
order.
Comment
[1] This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal
system by protecting a person who has chosen to be represented by a
lawyer in a matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers who
are participating in the matter, interference by those lawyers with the
client-lawyer relationship and the uncounseled disclosure of information
relating to the representation.
[2] This Rule applies to communications with any person who is
represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the
communication relates.
[3] The Rule applies even though the represented person initiates or
consents to the communication. A lawyer must immediately terminate
communication with a person if, after commencing communication, the
lawyer learns that the person is one with whom communication is not
permitted by this Rule.
[4] This Rule does not prohibit communication with a represented
person, or an employee or agent of such a person, concerning matters
outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy
between a government agency and a private party, or between two
organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating
with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter.
Nor does this Rule preclude communication with a represented person
who is seeking advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise representing a
client in the matter. A lawyer may not make a communication prohibited
by this Rule through the acts of another. See Rule 8.4(a). Parties to a
matter may communicate directly with each other, and a lawyer is not
prohibited from advising a client concerning a communication that the
client is legally entitled to make. Also, a lawyer having independent
justification or legal authorization for communicating with a represented
person is permitted to do so.
[5] Communications authorized by law may include communications
by a lawyer on behalf of a client who is exercising a constitutional or
other legal right to communicate with the government. Communications
authorized by law may also include investigative activities of lawyers
representing governmental entities, directly or through investigative
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agents, prior to the commencement of criminal or civil enforcement
proceedings. When communicating with the accused in a criminal matter,
a government lawyer must comply with this Rule in addition to honoring
the constitutional rights of the accused. The fact that a communication
does not violate a state or federal constitutional right is insufficient to
establish that the communication is permissible under this Rule.
[6] A lawyer who is uncertain whether a communication with a
represented person is permissible may seek a court order. A lawyer may
also seek a court order in exceptional circumstances to authorize a
communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule, for
example, where communication with a person represented by counsel is
necessary to avoid reasonably certain injury.
[7] In the case of a represented organization, this Rule prohibits
communications with a constituent of the organization who supervises,
directs or regularly consults with the organization’s lawyer concerning
the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to
the matter or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may
be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability.
Consent of the organization’s lawyer is not required for communication
with a former constituent. If a constituent of the organization is
represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that
counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule.
Compare Rule 3.4(f). In communicating with a current or former
constituent of an organization, a lawyer must not use methods of
obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of the organization. See
Rule 4.4.
[8] The prohibition on communications with a represented person
only applies in circumstances where the lawyer knows that the person is
in fact represented in the matter to be discussed. This means that the
lawyer has actual knowledge of the fact of the representation; but such
actual knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule
1.0(f). Thus, the lawyer cannot evade the requirement of obtaining the
consent of counsel by closing eyes to the obvious.
[9] In the event the person with whom the lawyer communicates is
not known to be represented by counsel in the matter, the lawyer’s
communications are subject to Rule 4.3.

848

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:797

Appendix 2: Proposed Rule 4.2
Communication with Person Represented by Counsel
(a) A lawyer participating in a matter shall not communicate about the
matter with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another
lawyer in the matter, unless:
(1) the other lawyer consents to the communication;
(2) the communication is authorized by law or a court order;
(3) the communication is necessary in light of what the lawyer
reasonably believes to be an emergency;
(4) the represented person is a public officer or agency and the
communication is either consented to by the public officer or agency or is
in writing with a copy sent to the other lawyer; or
(5) the represented person initiates the communication, a fact that is
confirmed in writing.
(b) A lawyer engaged in communication permitted by this Rule shall not
seek or obtain information protected by the attorney-client privilege or
work-product immunity, and shall comply with the standard of conduct
in Rule 4.3.
(c) A communication is authorized by law when it is inconnection with:
(1) a lawful investigation by or under authority of a public law
enforcement or regulatory agency;
(2) transmittal of legally required or permitted notice, such as
service of process;
(3) an investigative procedure permitted by public policy,
notwithstanding that it involves an element of deception, such as by
discrimination testers.
(d) Where an organization is represented by a lawyer in a matter, this
Rule applies to communication with a current constituent of the
organization:
(1) who supervises or directs the organization’s lawyer;
(2) who substantially participates in, or has authority to obligate the
organization with respect to, the representation; or
(3) whose acts or omissions materially contributed to the matter
underlying the representation.
Comment
[1] This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal
system by protecting the client-lawyer relationship against interference
by other lawyers participating in the matter. It protects against another
lawyer’s influence that might undermine a client’s confidence in his or
her lawyer and lead a client: to disclose privileged or confidential
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information, to refrain from pursuing certain claims, to agree to a
settlement, or to take other action without the advice of counsel. This
Rule’s protections are not unlimited, however, and must be balanced
with the role of informal investigation and fact-finding in limiting costs,
substantiating claims, and promoting legitimate law enforcement
activities within the legal system.
[2] This Rule applies to communications with any person who is
represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the
communication relates.
[3] This Rule does not prohibit communication with a represented
person, or an employee or agent of such a person, concerning matters
outside the scope of the representation. For example, the existence of a
controversy between a government agency and a private party, or
between two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from
communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding
unrelated matters or matters outside of the scope of the representation.
Nor does this Rule preclude communication with a represented person
who is seeking advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise representing a
client in the matter.
[4] A lawyer may not make a communication prohibited by this Rule
through the acts of another. See Rule 8.4(a). Where authorized by law,
however, government lawyers may advise law enforcement officials
about communications with a represented person prior to the filing of a
formal criminal charge or civil complaint against or the arrest of the
person in the matter. Non-lawyer parties to a matter may communicate
directly with each other, and a lawyer is not prohibited from advising a
client concerning a communication that the client is legally entitled to
make.
[5] This Rule applies to a lawyer who is a party to a proceeding in
the same manner as it does to a lawyer representing a client.
[6] In the case of a represented organization, consent of the
organization’s lawyer is not required for communication with a former
constituent unless the former constituent is represented by the
organization’s lawyer through an independent engagement or unless a
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the former constituent’s
conduct materially contributed to the matter underlying the
representation. In communicating with a former constituent, a lawyer
shall not seek to elicit privileged or confidential information. If a
constituent of the organization is represented in the matter by his or her
own lawyer, consent by that lawyer to a communication will be sufficient
for purposes of this Rule. Compare Rule 3.4(f). In communicating with a
current or former constituent of an organization, a lawyer must not use

850

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:797

methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of the
organization. See Rule 4.4.
[7] Once a proceeding has been certified as a class action and any
opt-out period has expired, members of the class are considered
represented persons for purposes of this Rule. Prior to that time, only
those members of the class with whom the class’s lawyer maintains a
personal client-lawyer relationship are considered represented persons.
[8] Communications authorized by law include communications that
a lawyer is authorized to make under Federal and state constitutional
law, statute, agency regulation having the force of law, or decision or rule
of a court of competent jurisdiction. Communications authorized by law
may include investigative activities of lawyers representing governmental
entities, directly or through investigative agents, prior to the
commencement of criminal or civil enforcement proceedings. When
communicating with the accused in a criminal matter, a government
lawyer has other legal obligations, such as those protecting constitutional
rights of an accused.
[9] A lawyer who is uncertain whether a communication with a
represented person is permissible may seek a court order. A lawyer may
also seek a court order in exceptional circumstances to authorize a
communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule, for
example, where the represented person’s lawyer is abusing this Rule,
where a lawyer has been unable to contact the represented person’s
lawyer, or where a public policy rationale strongly supports a waiver of
this Rule.
[10] Communications necessary in light of what the lawyer
reasonably believes to be an emergency include communications that the
lawyer believes necessary to address an imminent and reasonably certain
risk of death, substantial bodily harm or compromised personal safety.
They may also include communications that the lawyer believes
necessary to address an imminent risk of harm to the financial interests
or property of another, in furtherance of which the lawyer’s client used
the lawyer’s services. See Rule 1.6. Where the risk of harm is not
imminent, a lawyer should seek a court order prior to engaging in the
communication.
[11] Communications with a public officer or agency permitted
under this Rule include those by a lawyer on behalf of a client who is
exercising a constitutional or other legal right to communicate with the
government under Federal or state law. This exception does not
encompass communications regarding imminent or pending litigation,
nor does it apply to a public official who is potentially personally liable in
the matter in question.
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[12] A represented person, including a constituent of a represented
organization, may waive the protections of this Rule by initiating the
communication with the lawyer. A lawyer involved in a matter who is
contacted by a represented person in the matter shall confirm the
represented person’s communication in writing.
[13] The prohibition on communications with a represented person
only applies in circumstances where the lawyer knows that the person is
in fact represented in the matter to be discussed. This means that the
lawyer has actual knowledge of the fact of the representation; but such
actual knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule
1.0(f). Thus, the lawyer cannot evade the requirement of obtaining the
consent of counsel by closing eyes to the obvious. In the context of
organizational representation, the prohibition on communications
applies where the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a
constituent is in a position within the organization to be classified as a
represented person. This means that the lawyer has actual knowledge of
the constituent’s position or that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and
competence would have actual knowledge in the same circumstances.
See Rule 1.0(j).
[14] When a lawyer communicates with a person not known to be
represented by counsel or with a represented person under an exception
to this Rule, the lawyer’s communications are subject to Rule 4.3. When
engaging in undercover investigatory communications authorized by law,
however, a lawyer is not required to identify the lawyer’s identity and
role in the matter.
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